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Two-sided markets have become a major topic of an academic discussion in the past two decades. 
This discussion is fueled by the growing importance of the two-sided market platforms in the econ-
omy. The ongoing growth of these platforms has sparked multiple models and point of views in the 
academic discussion. Thus, there are overlapping models and definitions for this phenomenon. 
This study introduces the reader to the subject. It does this by starting from the foundations of the 
two-sided market literature and from previously established network effect literature which has later 
influenced the development of two-sided market literature. The study then finds a suitable definition 
for the phenomenon. The thesis then introduces some key pieces of the current literature regarding 
two-sided markets. It analyzes different theories and draws connections between them. The main 
focuses in the analysis, are to find suitable definitions for the phenomenon and to explore different 
competition situations and dynamics.  
The study also finds and presents suitable empirical examples for the presented theories. The 
examples are mainly from previous studies. There are two key points in presenting the examples. 
First, to draw the connection between the presented theory and empirical examples. And second, 
present and analyze possible effects that the two-sided markets have on their surrounding economies. 




 x   Pro gradu -tutkielma 
 
  Lisensiaatintutkielma 
   Väitöskirja 
Oppiaine Kansantaloustiede Päivämäärä 25.4.2018 
Tekijä(t) Lagerspetz, Leevi 
Matrikkelinumero 417468 
Sivumäärä 78 
Otsikko Two-sided Markets: Competition of Marketplaces 
Ohjaaja(t) Professori Hannu Salonen 
 
 
Two-sided market eli vapaasti suomennettuna kaksipuoleinen markkina on taloustieteen ilmiö, 
joka on viimeisen kahdenkymmenen vuoden aikana noussut akateemisen keskustelun aiheeksi. 
Tämä johtuu paljolti siitä, että niin sanotut kaksipuoleiset markkina alustat (two-sided market plat-
forms) ovat kasvaneet suuriksi toimijoiksi yritys maailmassa. Tämä menestys on saanut aikaan 
akateemista pohdintaa aiheen ympäriltä ja artikkeleja aiheesta on kirjoitettu monelta kantilta ta-
loustieteestä kilpailulainsäädäntöön.  
Kenties johtuen aiheen tuoreudesta sekä useista näkökulmista, ei kaksipuoleiselle markkinalle 
ole löytynyt täysin kattavaa määritelmää. Tämä artikkeli avaa aiheen lukijalleen. Aiheen avaami-
nen tapahtuu esittelemällä sen tärkeimmät teoriat sekä kaksipuoleisiin markkinoihin kiinteästi liit-
tyvien verkostovaikutusten perusteoriat. Näiden avulla esitellään hyväksyttävä kaksipuoleisten 
markkinoiden määritelmä sekä opitaan tuntemaan aiheen tärkeimpiä teorioita. Näitä teorioita tar-
kastellaan lähemmin ja niiden esittämiä malleja analysoidaan. 
Mallien analysointi tapahtuu paitsi avaamalla niitä matemaattisesti, myös etsimällä niihin so-
veltuvia empiirisiä esimerkkejä. Empiiriset esimerkit esitellään ja niitä analysoidaan suhteessa lä-
pikäytyihin malleihin. Empiirisiin esimerkkeihin liitetään myös pohdintaa liittyen niiden kansan-
taloustieteellisiin vaikutuksiin. 
 
Asiasanat Two-sided market (kaksi puoleinen markkina), network effect (verkosto-
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Most of the fundamental economic theories are based on the assumption that there is a 
functioning market, where buyers and sellers are efficiently able to match and trade goods 
or services. However, there are phenomena like stock exchange, booking agents, shop-
ping malls and so forth, where there controversially exists a third party that sets up a 
platform or a location for trade. Those markets function just as the regular ones where 
operating sets of agents match each other and trade or get some other benefits that exceed 
the cost of participating in the platform. These sorts of platforms set by a third party are 
generally accepted in literature as two-sided market platforms and are sometimes referred 
as two-sided markets or just platforms.  
Often the value of these platforms can be solely attributed to the amount of user base 
they have managed to attract. If there would be a new credit card that no merchant accepts, 
it would have no value and no one would want to own one. On the other hand, if nobody 
used the credit card no merchant would probably accept it. Still, Visa Inc. is currently 
valued at over 280 billion dollars in the stock market generating over 17 USD billion 
revenue in 2017 (Visa Inc. Annual report 2017, 122). Somehow, it was able to attract the 
users turning something that had no value for its first users into a multi-billion business 
and into a most normal payment method.  
Platforms must get both buyers and sellers simultaneously on board. In fact, there were 
multiple tries on launching the first credit card before BankAmericard, ancestor of Visa 
managed to establish a successful widely used network of buyers using the card and 
sellers accepting it (Nocera 1994, 23). 
This idea of two-sided markets brings a new fascinating point of view into economic 
discussion where market can be sometimes created and made to function. Then these 
market platforms can compete with one another as their own entities. Interestingly, quite 
different economic laws apply to the competition between these markets as compared to 
regular economic laws. They for instance, can apply negative prices to their users for an 
indefinite time period. Sometimes the demand curve seems to be almost flat, while at the 
same time the platforms’ marginal costs can be close to zero creating some very interest-
ing competition situations that would be quite unusual in a normal economic environ-
ment. 
Internet has brought these platforms significantly more potential. It has made partici-
pation in two-sided markets much easier by removing the geographic obstacles. Thus, 
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companies like Amazon, Uber and Airbnb have challenged traditional industries by con-
necting the buyers and sellers together without owning books, cars or taxis. Simultane-
ously, increased computing power and more sophisticated software has automated many 
previously human tasks. This also adds to the potential of the two-sided market platforms 
and now, for instance, intermediary platforms like travel agents are exponentially more 
efficient as one webpage can connect millions of travelers with flights or hotels with min-
imal operative staff. (Zervas & Proserpio & Byers 2016, 687). 
While the technological advances have brought many possibilities for this kind of plat-
forms to emerge, the platforms are often facing fierce competition as well. This has 
caused two-sided market platforms to develop interesting strategies to win the competi-
tion. Adequate pricing model and advertising of the platforms are key strategies in ex-
panding and maintaining their market share (Evans 2003, 238). 
In order to enter the market, platforms might need to adapt pricing strategies that can 
be considered predatory by antitrust laws (Evans 2003, 238). However, pricing strategies 
of two-sided market platforms can be peculiar regardless of the competition. For instance, 
price discrimination is very common and even imposing a negative price can be optimal 
strategy for a platform to maximize their profit. Finally, as a result of the peculiar pricing, 
the consumer welfare does not always follow the traditional laws of economics. This ar-
ticle will demonstrate how optimal pricing of the platforms service is complex and strik-
ingly different to pricing in many usual economic theories. Additionally, it is possible 
that multiple openly competing platforms can controversially lower the consumer welfare 
instead of increasing it (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003, 323).  
Although there are some old examples of two-sided markets such as market squares 
or stock exchanges, the topic of this article is relatively new with first references to the 
subject dating back not more than twenty years. Still, recently there have been multiple 
publications on the topic as it has been popular in the past 10 – 15 years, not only in 
academic circles, but in business world as well. Most well-known theoretical groundwork 
include, for instances, “Chicken & Egg; Competition Among intermediation service pro-
viders” (2003) by Caillaid & Jullien and series of articles by Rochet & Tirole starting in 
(2003) with an Article “Platform competition in Two-sided markets”. Other authors that 
have been active in developing the theory of this subject are, for instance Rysman and 
Armstrong who both have multiple articles on the subject. There are other authors on 
theory side and most of them are basing their models on the Rochet & Tirole’s article 
which seems to be the cornerstone of the two-sided market theory.  
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There have been also some different perspectives on two-sided markets and some em-
pirical studies on the topic. Emch & Thompson take an anti-trust perspective towards the 
competition between the platforms while Bilotkach & Rupp’s (2014) empirical study on 
online travel agents provides empirical evidence on pricing systems in a competition sit-
uation between two-sided market platforms. Some articles also focus on two-sided market 
platforms competing against traditional industries. Zervas & Proserpio & Byers (2016) 
made a study on how traditional hotel industry can compete against a platform company 
and how consumers benefit from this new competition. Literature used in this article also 
includes some older articles on network effects, a topic that is critically related to two-
sided markets and sometimes even considered an umbrella subject for the two-sided mar-
kets. Hence, there is even some literature that analyzes two-sided markets without using 
the terminology. One of them is Yannis Bakos, who discusses many of the two-sided 
market aspects already in 1998 in his paper “The Emerging Role of Electronic Market-
places on the Internet”. Even though the paper did not take a very deep look at the theory 
behind the phenomenon it is very well known for being ahead of its time. The reason is 
that Bakos managed to understand most of the key concepts of the two-sided markets and 
based on his understanding managed to identify many industries that would be deeply 
affected by the rise of the internet marketplaces.  
1.1 Goal and the structure of this article 
I have several main goals in this article. First, I try to clarify the notion of two-sided 
markets. I do this by introducing the reader into the subject and by finding some adequate 
definition and characteristics for the phenomenon. This goal is mainly achieved in the 
chapter two, where I will study the literature of the subject and define the phenomenon 
of two-sided market.  
Defining the phenomenon seems appropriate as the literature of the subject is relatively 
new and overlaps with the literature of network effects. Additionally, the current defini-
tion of two-sided market is very wide. While the wide definition might not be a problem 
it can be useful to divide two-sided markets in sub categories. Thus, second chapter not 
only tries to find the definition but also divides two-sided markets into two different types. 
Finding the definition and dividing it in two helps to limit the scope of this article. This 
is also reasonable as there are multiple very different types of two-sided markets and the 
relevant models can be more suitable for some cases than to others.  
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Second goal of this article is to go through and analyze some of the main competition 
theories related to the subject and describe how they fit into the definition of the two-
sided markets. When analyzing the theories one key point is to note differences to regular 
competition theories. This is not only interesting but helps in for further developing the 
definition. Another essence in analyzing the competition theories is to start developing 
an understanding on which empirical examples would be the most relevant with which 
specific models. This also further advances the development of the definition and helps 
in understanding the models. The chapters two, three and four will explain the main the-
ories of the two-sided markets and why these theories are relevant. The chapters will open 
the models so that they are easier to understand. In these chapters, I will also start to build 
a connection of the models to real-world examples. However, the examples will be dis-
cussed more in detail in later chapters as the chapters two to four are more focused on the 
models and theory. 
The chapter number three will go through three models from three different articles. 
One of them is from the article by Rochet & Tirole (2003) and the rest of them are based 
on the model presented in that article. However, while they use the theoretical base, the 
articles have very different perspectives on the topic. They also manage to bring different 
ideas on into the theory.  
The first sub-chapter of chapter three presents a basic a monopolistic competition 
model. The chapter is written from anti-trust perspective towards payment cards and re-
fers to articles treating the subject from that point of view. The second part of the chapter 
analyzes monopoly situation when the two-sided markets are essentially matching tools. 
It bases again the fundamental theory on the Rochet & Tirole article but analyses it in a 
situation that is perhaps more suitable for internet matching platforms than for payment 
card industry as the model in the previous chapter. The third subchapter discusses a situ-
ation where there are two competing platforms in the market. 
Chapter four brings up a different angle on the competition between the two-sided 
markets. Besides the Rochet & Tirole’s model, there is another famous article on the two-
sided market competition by Caillaud & Jullien (2003). It has a rather different view on 
how the competition works. Nevertheless, it should be recognized as one of the two main 
articles on the topic and thus, is analyzed in this study. First subchapter of this chapter 
has a look on a situation where the services are exclusive meaning that the users of the 
platforms can only register into one platform at a time while the second subchapter views 
a situation where platforms are nonexclusive and where multi-homing is possible. Both 
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subchapters also analyze strategies that platforms adopt to be competitive in the market. 
These strategies are often seen in the real-world examples of two-sided markets, as well. 
The third subchapter has a quick look on the implications of the model regarding who 
wins when platforms are competing.  
The third goal is to draw a line between the theory and the practice. This is achieved 
by introducing empirical examples and analyzing them thoroughly. This, will not only 
help in understanding the theory but sheds some light on the definition of the two-sided 
market, as well.  
The fifth chapter provides a set of empirical examples of two-sided markets in the real 
world. In the chapter, I draw connections between the examples and the relevant theories 
studied in this article and try to analyze, which of the theories fits the best to the example. 
I will go through the difficulties of becoming competitive in the market. There is critical 
amount number of users in both sides of the platform that should be attracted to use the 
service for it become valuable. This can cause problems even if there is no competition. 
The first subchapter provides an empirical example of the problem and solutions to it. 
The second subchapter will jump into a situation where there already is competition be-
tween two-sided market platforms. The subchapter discusses strategies used by the plat-
forms to compete with one another and capture market. These strategies can involve for 
instance pricing or advertising. The third subchapter discusses how a platform coming 
into a market can have a large effect on practices in the whole industry and what kind of 
competitive advantages a platform can have in the market. The fourth subchapter dis-
cusses a bit more in detail the competitive advantages of the platforms and who can best 
benefit from them. The final part of the chapter takes the opposite view on the subject. It 
analyses the subject from the point of view that who loses when a platform comes into a 
market. The sixth chapter is reserved for the conclusions of this article followed by the 
references.  
Lastly this article wants to further promote research on the two-sided markets. This is 
achieved by presenting current literature and suggesting interesting topics for further re-
search within the subject. Of course, all the chapters are meant to contribute to this goal. 
However, in the conclusion chapter there are some suggestions for further research on the 
topic. 
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1.2 Methodology  
In this study methodology consist of two sections the literature review and, to support it, 
the empirical section with examples. The literature section is again divided in three chap-
ters two, three and four. The main goal of the chapter two is to find an adequate definition 
for the phenomenon. There is no comprehensive literature of this subject as it relatively 
recently became a subject of scientific discussion.  
However, there is a collection of articles that try to establish an accepted definition 
that can be used in this study. Rochet & Tirole “Platform competition in Two-sided mar-
kets” (2003) and their continuation on this subject “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Re-
port” (2006) have laid a great ground work on the theory of two-sided markets. Apart 
from Rochet & Tirole, for instance Mark Rysman has made important contributions to-
wards the definition of the two-sided markets with two articles. First, “Competition Be-
tween Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages” (2004) and second “The Eco-
nomics of Two-Sided Markets” (2009).  
There are also a number other articles help in finding an acceptable definition. For 
example, Armstrong (2006) and Evans (2003) have provided to the frame work. In addi-
tion, there are attempts to create a definition to two-sided markets from an antitrust point 
of view. Market definition in Two-Sided Markets: “Theory and Practise, by Filistrucchi. 
Geradin, Van Damme & Affeldt” (2014) tries to find a definition for the phenomenon 
that would be useful for the competition law officials. Moreover, when discussing the 
definition of the two-sided markets, it is appropriate to study network effects. The discus-
sion on network effects started already in 1985 with article by Katz & Sapiro: “Network 
Externalities, Competition and Compatibility”. However, it should be noted when dis-
cussing articles prior to 2001 that the term of two-sided markets had not appeared yet.  
The second goal of the literature review is to discuss the current theory on the compe-
tition between two-sided market platforms. There are number of articles discussing the 
theory on how the competition differs from competition that is generally discussed in the 
economic field. Besides the efforts of Rochet & Tirole, there is for instance: Caillaud & 
Jullien‘s “Chicken & egg: competition among intermediation service providers” (2003). 
There also exists relevant theory on the subject even prior to the discovery of the defini-
tion of two-sided markets. “The Emerging Role of Electronic Marketplaces on the Inter-
net” (1998) an article by Yannis Bako discusses the very subject of two-sided market-
places while never mentioning the term. However, the article manages to find many key 
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industries that quickly saw a spurt of two-sided market platforms entering into the market. 
It also treats the subject in a different way than the network effect literature and is thus a 
bit hard to simply lump with research made prior to the first articles mentioning the def-
inition ‘two-sided markets’.  
In the section of examples, I will use a wider range of sources. It will include some 
studies from completion law point of view as it is often relevant in the platform economy. 
I will also include articles with empirical examples from different industries but most 
from the travel industry where the usage of different two-sided market platforms has been 
wide spread for over a decade. I will also use some publications by companies such as 
their annual reports, as well as some internet-based sources in the empirical section in 
chapter five. This chapter includes more of my own analysis and logical reasoning as a 
form of discussing the subject further and linking the theory from chapters two, three and 
four to the examples in chapter five.  
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2 THE DEFINITION OF A TWO-SIDED MARKET PLAT-
FORM 
Although, there are number of articles discussing two-sided markets and platform econ-
omy, there seems to be no widely accepted definition of what a two-sided market is. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, no author has taken up to make a comprehensive book 
on this subject. Therefore, it seems appropriate to start this study with a look of multiple 
definitions written previously of the subject to find a more comprehensive definition for 
this phenomenon. Two-sided market, two-sided market platform and sometimes just plat-
form are used quite synonymously in literature and in this article. However, when talking 
about the concept I will use the term “two-sided market” and when talking about a spe-
cific subject, I will use the term “two-sided market platform” or just “platform”. To no-
tice, the example platforms can sometimes also multi-sided but in this article. However, 
the theory behind multi-sided platforms is very limited and thus I try to limit the multi-
sidedness out of discussion. 
Most of the articles take a network benefits approach to the phenomenon and point out 
that there are at least two characteristics that are in place in every two-sided market. First 
there needs to be a third party that sets up a platform for two or more sets of agents to 
operate. Second, the decisions of each set of agents influence the outcome of the other set 
of agents. Marc Rysman, in his article “The Economics of Two-Sided Markets” takes this 
approach to the question. “Broadly speaking, a two-sided market is one in which 1) two 
sets of agents interact through an intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of each 
set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of agents, typically through an exter-
nality.”  
The role of the intermediary is often a crucial aspect to distinct a two-sided market 
from a one-sided market. Both can have intermediaries but in a one-sided market they 
actively participate in selling or buying goods whereas in a case of a two-sided market 
the intermediary acts more as a platform that facilitates the trade between sides of the 
market. However, this definition is broad and not exclusive. Multiple industries that do 
not seemingly use platforms such as car manufacturing would fall under the definition of 
two-sided markets. Car manufacturers need to obtain both car owners of their specific 
brand and mechanics with knowledge to repair the specific brand to have competitive 
network. If they succeed, they in fact, also bring utility to both sides and thus, facilitate 
the trade between them. (Rysman 2009, 127). The wide definition might not be a problem. 
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Even if almost all industries have aspects of a two-sided market, the aspects are often not 
significant Rysman (2009, 127). 
2.1 Network externalities 
To define the phenomenon of two-sided market, it may be necessary to examine the situ-
ations where they emerge, to understand what utility they bring to the sides of the market. 
The network effects are often discussed in the literature about two-sided markets. In fact, 
the definitions are very similar and closely related to each other. In both cases the demand 
of a good depends on the accessibility of the complementary good which demand, in turn, 
depends of the amount of the original good. Two-sided market literature can be some-
times treated as a subset of network effect literature (Rysman 2009, 127).  
Since the two definitions are so closely related, it is important to briefly study the 
literature of network effects. The network effect was introduced in literature by Katz and 
Shapiro in their article “Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility” (1985). 
In their study, they found that the number of users having a compatibly equipment can 
influence the value of other compatibly equipment. They focused on goods that need a 
post purchase network to operate such as hardware/software. The users of a specific hard-
ware would benefit from the number of software producers and vice versa. This idea leads 
into inverse demand curves where the number of software producers depend on the usage 
of the consumers and demand of the consumers to use the platform depend on the number 
of the software producers on that specific platform. 
The hardware software thinking can be expanded to other industries as well. The net-
work effect has a key role in the usage of yellow pages and they have similar character-
istics as the software platforms or hardware (Rysman, 2004, 484). However, unlike using 
software where some hardware is always needed, in the case of yellow pages the platform 
seems be only a facilitator of the trade between sellers and buyers. Therefore, the funda-
mental utility to the consumers seems to lie only in the network benefits. On the other 
hand, it could make sense for a hardware producer to produce software if the sellers are 
not plenty enough to satisfy the demand.  
The rise of internet has made these aggregators, where the value is defined by the 
amount of usage, very relevant in many industries. It is not a surprise that Yellow pages 
have been completely replaced by similar internet-based platforms for instance Fonecta 
Finder and of course, search engines such as Google or Yahoo.  
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2.2 Centralized matching market and search theory 
In the case of hardware software industries, it is very easy to understand why two-sided 
platforms exist as for instance it is impossible to play a game without a console. However, 
in the cases of yellow pages, payment cards or online shopping platforms such as eBay, 
the reason for two-sided platforms to emerge, is different. There is no requirement for a 
buyer and a seller to trade on the platform provided by service and they could instead 
match each other in other way. Nevertheless, centralized matching markets have been 
around for a long time, for instance, in forms of stock exchanges and labor agencies. 
Therefore, a facilitated matching clearly brings enough utility for the agents so that they 
choose to participate in the platform and are even willing to pay a fee to get an access to 
it if necessary. 
Often buyers face a significant search cost when looking to purchase a product. Sellers 
are thus, able to exploit this search cost by setting monopolistic prices in the market. 
Electronic marketplaces and intermediary platforms can lower the cost of search for the 
consumer, and in the process, lower the ability of the seller to implement monopolistic 
pricing strategies, as well. The intermediary platform can steer the market to became more 
competitive as more information is available and thus, increasing the welfare of the con-
sumer and the total welfare. The intermediaries often try to facilitate the trade between 
parties to make their service more attractive which of course is positive for the welfare in 
general. (Bako 1998, 40 – 41).  
One of the two-sided markets’ main function can be considered internalizing and shar-
ing the otherwise non-internalized network benefits. This means, that the failure of Coase 
theorem is a necessary condition for the existence of two-sided markets. However, it is 
not a sufficient condition (Rochet & Tirole 2006, 649). Coase argues in his paper “The 
Problem of Social Cost” (1960) that even in the presence of externalities, with tradable 
property rights, with perfect information and with close to zero transaction costs, the ne-
gotiating parties will always reach a Pareto efficient outcome. If this theory holds, clearly 
no matching platform is needed or that it could be organized by either the buyers or the 
sellers in a such way that they share the network benefits amongst them. In two-sided 
markets, the volume of the trade depends on both the price level and the structure whereas 
if Coase theorem holds, it depends only on the price level (Rochet & Tirole 2006, 649). 
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However, Coase theorem can fail and often does for reasons that are not related to pres-
ence of two-sided markets. Coase theorem can fail due to a presence of asymmetric in-
formation and it usually just results in lower amount of trade. 
In practice, many of the two-sided markets aim to alleviate problems that prevent mar-
kets from reaching optimal conditions. Many online shopping sites like Amazon, eBay or 
any flight search engine fall in the category of an intermediary that lowers search cost 
and brings information for the consumer. Even the example of the yellow pages men-
tioned in the previous chapter could be included as this type of intermediary. These two-
sided markets clearly differ from hardware platforms as their key function is to alleviate 
market frictions and their benefits solely rely on network effects. Another clear difference 
between matching platforms and hardware platforms is the exclusivity. When platforms 
are not exclusive either consumers or producers can engage in multi-homing which means 
that they participate in two or more platforms simultaneously. (Callaud & Julien 2003, 
315). From the buyer side hardware tend to be more exclusive as they often have a cost 
of buying the platform, for instance a gaming console, whereas matchmaking platforms 
usually do not have ex ante cost.  
2.3 Intermediary role 
A two-sided market is a firm that acts as a facilitating platform for trade (Evans 2003). 
The role of the intermediary, as a third party setting up a platform for trade, is the prime 
distinction between the literature of network effects and the literature of two-sided mar-
kets. The emphasis is on strategies studied. The literature of two-sided markets focuses 
more on pricing strategies and how a platform can maximize its revenues, while the lit-
erature of network effects is discussing the optimal network sizes and how the consumers 
tend to adopt the new technologies. (Rysman 2009, 127).  
Most definitions of the two-sided markets include intermediaries in them. The clearest 
examples of two-sided markets are media markets, payment card markets and online in-
termediaries (Filistrucchi, Geradin, Van Damme & Affeldt 2014, 297). However, there 
are reasons not to limit the intermediaries to online. For example, shopping malls or stock 
exchange could also be considered as two-sided markets based on many of their proper-
ties. For example, there are clearly network effects in a shopping mall and they are not 
internalized by the buyer and the sellers. A shopping mall would also follow the typical 
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pricing structure of the two-sided markets that will be briefly presented in the next sub-
chapter and analyzed later more throughout. 
One key point in the intermediate role is that it helps in internalizing the network ben-
efits created by the sides of the market. This is where the Coase theorem fails and leaves 
a room for the two-sided market to surge. In some cases, it can even be able to return the 
network benefit specifically to the agent that generates it. For instance, a very popular 
seller can negotiate a better contract with the platform than a less popular one.  
 
The two-sided markets have often sub-categories depending on the role of the inter-
mediary and the nature of the market, as well. One common categorization is whether the 
markets are transactional or non-transactional. A transactional market would be for in-
stance eBay while non-transactional market could be a media house or google where ads 
generate the revenue. (Filistrucchi, et al. 2014, 298). In some empirical examples, these 
two can often overlap as a platform can collect revenue from both transactions and ad-
vertising. Then the market can be considered multi-sided.  
However, in this article the multi-sidedness is left without further analysis as often one 
of these revenue streams is more important for the platform than the other and it is easier 
to analyze a platform as a two-sided market than a multi-sided one. 
Another potential division for two-sided markets is the usage of hardware in relation 
to the intermediary role. If there is some hardware or other necessary tool for the usage 
of the end product, the platform has some advantages compared to a pure intermediary 
platform. Consider Apple or Microsoft compared to a flight search engine or eBay. While 
Apple and Microsoft now also have intermediate roles as connecting software creators 
with their customers, they both initially had separate core businesses as making of the 
software usage possible. On the other hand, eBay or flight search engines directly started 
as two-sided platforms and their values lie strictly in the numbers using them.  
1.Figure: Two-sided market 
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Now, a platform providing hardware or other necessary tool for the usage of an end 
product has less worries of their customers leaving them for a competing provider as all 
their users have sunk costs in form of already bought software. Later in this study it is 
observed how affects the users’ ability to multi-home. In addition, these platforms have 
other advantages. Apple for instance, always has an option to code and sell its own soft-
ware but for example Trivago cannot really operate as an airline. This advantage is useful 
especially if there is a problem of getting one side to use the platform which is a common 
problem. 
Often an intermediary role of a new two-sided market platform can be something that 
has existed before in some form as an intermediary but a new technology has made it 
possible to create a two-sided market platform as a new and a more efficient business 
model to compete with the older ones and often drive them out of business. The ad-
vantages of the new technologies are often related to lower marginal cost, more efficient 
matching and wider reachability of customers. Examples, where this change from small 
scale intermediary to a platform or a two-sided market, are found for instance in travel 
agent and travel booking industry or in dating industry. In general, those industries where 
intermediary services were performed by labor but can now be automated by an algorithm 
may provide these examples. 
In this study, I will present theories that are suitable for both types of the two-sided 
markets. However, in my examples I mainly focus on platforms whose primary business 
is to facilitate the trade between buyers and sellers and try to identify their typical char-
acteristics. I will thus, not provide clear examples of industries that focus on hardware as 
a platform even if the network externalities are strong in the industry. However, it seems 
to be a clearer example of a two-sided market when a platform is only setting up the 
market and facilitating the trade. In the case of two-sided markets with strong presence 
of hardware, the platform is often selling their own applications through the platform, as 
well. The threat of newcomers in the industry is also significantly lower and more at-
tributed to the technology behind the platform than the brand recognition. Consider an 
eCommerce site versus a gaming console as example of this.  
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2.4 Buyer and seller demand curves and pricing structure 
In some literature on two-sided markets, the fees that platform collects from the partici-
pating agents, have a link to the definition of two-sided market and therefore it is im-
portant to discuss this on the definition chapter of this article. Two sided markets have a 
peculiar pricing system compared to one-sided markets. The subject will be analyzed 
more in detail on later chapters but to reach a sufficient definition for the two-sided mar-
ket, a general discussion of the pricing and demand curves is needed. 
As discussed in the chapter on network effects, the demand curves of using the plat-
form for the both sides of the platform depend on the number of users on the other side. 
This means that there are non-internalized externalities for end users. (Rochet & Tirole 
2003, 991). The fact that the demand curves for both sides of the platform depend on each 
other encourages the platform to practice price discrimination. If the two sides have dif-
ferent price elasticity on the use of the platform, the owner of the platform can use this to 
charge only one side of the users. In a case of a shopping mall it would be extremely 
unusual to charge consumers for entering the mall.  
The price discrimination is a key characteristic for a two-sided market. In fact, part of 
the definition of two-sided market is that the pricing of both sides should affect the vol-
ume of trade separately. (Rochet & Tirole 2003, 1018). It can be shown as following. 
Volume of the trade 𝑄 depends on the price P =  𝑃𝑎  +  𝑃𝑏. If the market is two-sided the 
𝑄 depends on both 𝑃𝑎 and 𝑃𝑏 individually and changes if either 𝑃𝑎 or 𝑃𝑏 changes while P 
is constant. On the other hand, if 𝑄 only depends on the total price P the market is one-
sided.  
A clear example of a one-sided market is a bilateral electricity trading with injection 
and withdrawal charges. The consumption of the electricity only depends on the total 
price of the transmission including charges on both sides but not on the decomposition of 
the price. (Rochet & Tirole 2006, 648). 
The cross-network combined with the independent demand functions can cause pecu-
liar pricing structures. The following picture illustrates how a two-sided market platform 




2.Figure: Demand pricing dependence 
𝑃𝑏 , 𝑃𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑏∗, 𝑃𝑠∗𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠 
𝐷𝑏 , 𝐷𝑠 , 𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑠∗𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠 
𝑄𝑏 , 𝑄𝑠, 𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄𝑏∗𝑄𝑠∗𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑠  
In the figure, at the starting point, platform imposes same positive prices 𝑃𝑏 , 𝑃𝑠 for 
both sides of the platform. However, now the platform decides to change its pricing struc-
ture by lowering its fees for buyer while increasing it to the sellers. It imposes a negative 
price for the buyers. This can be for example a gift for joining the platform. It can be seen 
how the negative price 𝑃𝑏∗ set by the platform towards the buyers, results in increase in 
quantity𝑄𝑏∗. This increases the demand for the product on the other side of the market 
which, in turn shifts the whole demand function towards right𝐷𝑠∗resulting in higher quan-
tity 𝑄𝑠∗ with higher price𝑃𝑠∗.  
Thus, the platform can increase its profits simply by changing the price structure. It 
does so by taking advantage of cross-network effects as sellers’ demand dependent on the 
buyers’ demand for the platforms service. The optimal price structure can sometimes in-
clude even negative price towards one side of the platform. These pricing strategies will 
be discussed more in later chapters of this article. 
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2.5 Proposed definition of two-sided market for this thesis 
As discussed in this work there is hardly an accepted definition for the two-sided market. 
However, there are some key characteristics associated with the two-sidedness of a mar-
ket that have arisen in this chapter. For this article and further consideration, I propose 
the following characteristics for the two-sided market: 
1) Failure of the Coase theorem:  
a) Uninternalized network benefits. Agents on the platform are not able to 
internalize the network benefits of the platform. A necessary condition 
for a two-sided market to emerge.  
b) The two sides of the market are not able to bargain the network benefits 
themselves. This one is a weak condition as to some extent, it can be bent. 
Hence, the price discrimination within a side can be beneficial for the 
platform. 
2) There is a third party that sets up the platform for trade or somehow facili-
tates the trade between the sellers and buyers. The important part is that it is 
a third party making the trade neutral for the two sides. If the platform would 
not be neutral it would fall more into either monopoly category or monop-
sony category in a one-sided market depending on which side has set up this 
platform. 
3) The volume of trade is dependent of the individual pricing for both sides of 
the platform. This is a necessary condition as it is something that clearly 
separates the two-sided markets from one-sided markets. The difference is 
of course, that in one-sided market the volume of trade depends solely on the 
total cost of using the platform. 
4) Distinction in platforms: 
a) A transaction platform or a non-transaction platform. The difference on 
business model separates platforms like Google from such as Trivago. 
This definition is argued to be a very relevant difference in antitrust pol-
icies.  
b) Necessary platform and a facilitating platform. Both can be two-sided 
market but, in some cases, such as hardware the platform is a requirement 
to use the end product. A necessary platform could often also very well 
fill the gap for the seller side themselves and are often partially doing it. 
If filling the gap for sellers is heavily used then some of the other condi-
tions automatically become under question for instance neutrality condi-
tion (2) and the independent pricing condition (3). 
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These characteristics are based on previous studies except for the number 4 b which, 
while not a condition for two-sidedness of a market makes a clear distinction between the 
types of platforms. If the platform is not required to use the end product they always face 
competition or threat of upcoming competition even if they are the only platform proving 
the service. The necessary platforms might also have some stronger measurements of 
keeping users from changing the platform. For instance, if the user has a collection of 
software for an operating system they might be unwilling to change platform if they are 
forced to buy the same software again. If the platform is purely a trade facilitator, there 
is often little to lose when changing the platform. 
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3 COMPETITION BETWEEN TWO-SIDED MARKETS IN 
GENERAL 
This chapter in general discusses competition between two-sided market platforms. The 
competition differs quite extensively from a traditional competition between firms and 
therefore, it is important to explore multiple theories on this subject. The two-sided mar-
ket competition models vary depending on the conditions of the market, for instance, 
market power and the heterogeneity of the users. In addition, the models can be solely 
applicable for a certain industry as the characteristics between industries differ to an ex-
tent (Rochet & Tirole, 2003, 994). For instance, a game console platform has very little 
similarities with a shopping mall, while both can still be considered two-sided markets. 
One characteristic that is often prevailing in all the models is imperfect competition be-
tween the platforms. This is largely due to increasing benefits in economics of scale and 
inverse network benefits on the both sides of the platform.  
This chapter will go through some key models in different kind of industries. It starts 
with simple monopoly model as it is the simplest while surprisingly common in many 
industries. After that I present two relevant models. One has characteristic where the 
value of the platform is created by the service it is proving and second where the value 
comes solely from matching the agents. First could be relevant for instance in gaming 
console industry while second could be a flight booking service in the internet. I then take 
a look at some models where there are more than one players involved and take a bit 
deeper look towards the pricing systems. 
3.1 Monopoly situation in a two-sided market 
As mentioned in the introduction the monopoly can be a very relevant situation when the 
market is dominated by two-sided platforms. For example, the 5 largest companies in the 
world by market value in 2017 are one way or other platform economies. The list is con-
sisting tech giants that offer advertising platforms like Google and Facebook as well as 
companies like Apple and Microsoft that have previously focused on hardware and soft-
ware but have created their own platforms on top of them (Taplin, “Is It Time to Break 
Up Google?”, The New York Times, 22.4.2017) Out of these, at least the main service of 
Google, the search engine, could be considered almost a monopoly as it faces very little 
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competition. If someone is an Apple user they face a monopoly when purchasing apps 
and same applies to Microsoft users to some extent.  
The competition law agencies have taken a strong interest towards platforms as they 
grow the importance in the economy. However, the power of the two-sided market plat-
forms was noticed by the competition lawyers a lot before tech giants became the most 
valuable companies in the market. Eric Emch and Scott Thompson wrote an article “Mar-
ket Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks” (2006) about power of the 
two-sided market platforms.  
They wrote an article after serving US department of justice in a case of “United States 
v. Visa USA, Inc., Mastercard International, Inc., and Visa International, Inc., and United 
States v. First Data Corporation and Concord EFS, Inc.” The article analyzes the theory 
of prices set by the monopolist and tries to find a test to the monopolist’s market power. 
The model in this chapter, follows the model from the article by Emch and Thompson 
(2006). As stated in the introduction to this chapter, creating a universal model for that 
could capture all the possible industries would be impossible, thus this article will present 
somewhat specific as an example for this study. However, the model behind the example, 
is originally derived from Rochet & Tirole’s (2003) article and it is widely applicable for 
other industries.  
Assume a situation where a monopolistic two-sided market platform is a payment card 
network that has two sides. One of sides are the merchants accepting the card and other 
one the issuers, the issuing banks that eventually represent the consumers in the markets 
they pass every fee down to the consumer. The card, which is equivalent to the platform, 
is set up by the card brand. Demand for the two-sided market platform’s services will 
then depend on three different prices set by the payment card platform. There are two 
switch fees, one for the both sides of the platform and an interchange fee paid generally 
from the merchant to the card issuer. The prices in this chapter are denoted as 𝑝𝑚 for the 
merchant switch fee, 𝑝𝑖 for the issuer switch fee and 𝑋 as the interchange fee. In the early 
days of the payment card industry, the interchange fee was paid from the issuers to the 
merchants but now the situation is reversed. (Emch & Thompson 2006, 48). Since the 
interchange fee is now reversed, all the prices can be assumed positive although negative 
interchange fee would not disrupt the model. 
Now, the total prices for the merchants 𝑃𝑚 and the issuers 𝑃𝑖 are respectively the fol-
lowing: 
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 𝑃𝑚 = 𝑝𝑚 + 𝑋 
 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 + 𝑋 
Therefore, it can also be observed that the total fees collected by the platform per trans-
action are 𝑝𝑚 + 𝑝𝑖 and as the switch fee 𝑋 is not collected by the platform but by the 
issuer, it is equivalent to 𝑃𝑚 + 𝑃𝑖. Now, assume that the there is a marginal cost 𝑐 for each 
transaction arranged by the platform. Thus, the total profit 𝑅 for the platform per trans-
action is: 
 𝑅 = 𝑃𝑚 + 𝑃𝑖 − 𝑐 
From the equations (1) and (2), it can be noticed that 𝑃𝑖 can possibly be negative and that 
it will be the merchants who would end up paying the negative price as a form of the 
interchange fee X. A subsidize in a form of a negative price is something very character-
istic of a two-sided market as it was noted in the first chapter.  
The network faces a demand for the service that is dependent on the total prices (𝑃𝑚, 
𝑃𝑖) separately. The demand can be taken from the equations 1 and 2: 
 𝑄 = (𝑃𝑚, 𝑃𝑖), or  
 𝑄 = 𝑄(𝑝𝑚 + 𝑋, 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑋)  
Other key characteristic of the two-sided market is the demand that depends on both 
prices separately. They might face competitive products on either side of the market, in 
this case for example cash. It is assumed that the demand curve is a downward slope 
respect to each price. If the 𝑃𝑖 is negative the demand increases as 𝑃𝑖. This can in fact be 
very relevant in the payment card industry as with a negative price towards the card issuer, 
the platform can make sure that the issuer promotes the cards to all their customers mean-
ing the consumers who will ultimately use the card. This can lead to a situation where the 
platform is acting more like a monopsony rather than a monopoly. Emch & Thompson 
2006, 48).  
The payment card network must think how do merchants response when setting the 
pricing, 𝑃𝑚. The merchants can simply not accept the card and decline the transaction. 
Although, it should be noted that the merchants could in theory always accept the card 
provided that it remains profitable to sell their product. This can be sometimes seen as 
some merchants, (not in Finland though), do not accept a card transaction for small pur-
chases. Another way the merchants might react to the changes in 𝑃𝑚 is to steer away 
customers towards cash or other payment methods, for instance with a cash discount. 
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(Emch & Thompson 2006, 49). It is important to note, however, that often the merchants 
are not allowed to choose different prices when a customer decides to pay with a payment 
card and thus, users’ surplus of using the payment card is independent of the prices chosen 
by the platform and merchants (Rochet & Tirole 2003, 995). A recent lawsuit ended up 
giving the merchants a possibility to choose different prices for different form of pay-
ments but with a set of restrictions. (Mandelbaumaug, “Visa and MasterCard Settle Law-
suit, but Merchants Aren’t Celebrating” The New York Times, 8.8.2012). 
For the monopolist, the most important aspects in this model is, the impact that a 
change in the price structure has on the total number of transactions. This is since the 
demand ultimately is dependent only on the two net prices 𝑃𝑚 and 𝑃𝑖 that are linear com-




(𝑃𝑚 + 𝑃𝑖 − 𝑐)Q(𝑃𝑚, 𝑃𝑖) 
Or in the form of: 
 max
𝑝𝑚,X
(𝑝𝑚 + 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐)𝑄(𝑝𝑚 + 𝑋, 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑋)   
If it can be assumed that there is an internal solution to this problem, the first order con-
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From the equation seven it can be seen how the monopolist will choose a price level that 
maximizes the demand for the service at any given level of prices. The monopolist thus, 
chooses the interchange to a level that is efficient given the total price: 𝑃𝑚 + 𝑃𝑖. (Emch 
& Thompson 2006, 50). This is interesting due to the nature of monopolies in economics 
as they are normally considered relatively inefficient and are expected to choose a quan-
tity significantly lower than a competitive market.  










 is the relation between the elasticities of demand of 
merchant and issuer respectively. 
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So, in a sense, the platform’s job is to balance the relation of the elasticities with the 
relation of the prices to maximize the number of transactions. Here, it is important to 
notice that the elasticity for the card issuer can have positive values. This happens if 𝑃𝑖 is 
nega-tive which happens if the interchange fee is greater than the price towards the issuer 
𝑋 > 𝑝𝑖. An option for a platform to use negative price towards on side of the platform is 
a key characteristic of a two-sided market and a payment card network can very well 
impose this concept.  
The second first order condition, equation number (9), can be reformatted into a fol-
lowing equation: 




This equation greatly resembles the Lehner’s condition for a monopolist in a normal one-
sided market. This is illustrated more clearly as: 
 𝑝𝑚 + 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐 = 𝑝𝑚 + 𝑐𝑚,  
where 𝑐𝑚 would the marginal cost of platform per transaction or:  
 𝑐𝑚 = 𝑐 + 𝑋, in algebraic notation.  
The monopolist will choose the total price towards the merchants as the market was 
one-sided towards the merchant regardless of the value of the switch fee 𝑋. The conclu-
sion from the equations above is that the monopolist’s possibility to use its power is de-
pendent on the merchants’ inverse elasticity with respect to the merchant price or in al-
gebraic notation simply 
1
𝜀𝑚
 (Emch & Thompson 2006, 51). However, in the two-sided 
market model in payment card industry, it is generally the case that the price structure is 
dependent on the elasticities of demand, equation (10), as also mentioned earlier in the 
chapter. (Rochet & Tirole 2003, 997) 
To conclude this monopoly example of a two-sided market in payment card industry, 
it can be noted that the total price level of a platform is given by the standard Lehners 
formula and dependent on the inverse elasticities. Moreover, often the total price is solely 
dependent on the inverse elasticity of the merchant side instead of both the merchant’s 
and the issuers’ elasticities. However, the structure or how the total price is divided be-
tween the two sides of the market is dependent on the ratio of the elasticities. 
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In the lawsuit against Visa and the Master card, in 2012, the card providers ended up 
agreeing to pay 7.3 billion USD to 7 million merchants who sued them. Moreover, the 
merchants are now allowed to charge additional fees for card purchases. However, there 
are some restrictions in this freedom. The merchants cannot discriminate against some 
cards but are forced to charge all the forms of electronic payment equally. Therefore, it 
is unclear if the merchants are in fact able to fully use this option of steering the customers 
towards cash payments. (Mandelbaum, “Visa and MasterCard Settle Lawsuit, but Mer-
chants Aren’t Celebrating” The New York Times, 8.8.2012). Interestingly, it seems very 
clear that the merchants are not happy with the wide spread usage of the cards while they 
still have to participate in the platform in order to stay in business. The subject of who 
loses in the platform economy will be also discussed later in this article.  
3.2 Matching platform models and within-group negative externali-
ties 
In a case of a platform that provides matchmaking services the utility for the users forms 
differently to the card industry and thus, I start the model with different premises. In the 
card industry, the utility comes from the usage of the card for both sides of the platform 
meaning and often the customer has already made decision to use a specific seller and 
just prefers to use the card as a method of transaction. This means that the usage of the 
card was the source of utility for the buyer. On the other hand, in the matchmaking service 
the main utility of the platform comes from increased chance of finding a trading partner. 
Platforms can also create utility by providing an assurance that the trade happens and 
neither party is being cheated. However, while it can be important service by a platform 
it is discussed in very different literature involving concepts like moral hazard and thus, 
is less discussed in this article.  
In many cases, the value of the platform, solely depends from the number of the op-
tions on the other side of the two-sided markets (Filistrucchi, et al. 2014, 298 – 299). 
There are multiple platforms that have this model as a base for their service. For instance, 
hotel and flight booking aggregators in the internet such as Trivago or Booking.com. A 
shopping mall could be also considered this type of a two-sided market since the main 
value the mall brings is an increased demand and supply in a concentrated area. As al-
ready mentioned the cross-network effect is crucial in the matchmaking platform and the 
value of the platform is solely dependent on the number of users on the other side of the 
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platform. The network effect was of course true in the case of the credit card as well but 
in the matchmaking case there is also the possibility for a negative network effect which 
arises if there are too many agents of similar type on one side of the platform. One clear 
example of this would be a hetero dating club where both sexes would be happy to see 
lower number of people of their own sex present. (Chen & Huang 2012, 627). These 
externalities are in this article called negative within-group externalities. While taking the 
negative network effect into account and having the cross-network effect as the main 
value of the platform to its users, this subchapter presents a different model to describe 
these type of two-sided market platforms.  
The model in this subchapter is again based on the groundwork theory by Rochet & 
Tirole and it borrows greatly from Armstrong (2006) as well. However, it follows more 
closely a model from Chen & Huang’s (2012) article. The article presents a model with 
negative within-group externalities and is thus, chosen as an addition to existing models 
in this chapter. 
The model starts from an assumption that there are two sets of homogeneous agents, 
buyers and sellers. The buyers are denoted as 𝑏 and sellers as 𝑠. They represent the two 
sides of the platform and are interested in trading with each other. It is assumed that the 
chance of finding a trading partner without using this hypothetical monopoly platform 
close to zero.  
The platform has an efficient matching mechanism. Thus, number of buyers 𝑁𝑏 and 
sellers 𝑁𝑠 choose to enter to a platform to trade. If they enter they pay fees of 𝐹𝑏 and 𝐹𝑠 
to the platform regardless if they find a trading partner. It is also assumed that while the 
agents are homogeneous in regard of valuing the good they are heterogeneous regard the 
cost of entering to the platform. The homogeneity towards the good is captured by the 
value parameter 𝑉𝑏 that is equal for all the consumers. Similarly, for the seller the value 
of the good is captured in 𝑉𝑠. The heterogeneity of the cost is denoted with parameters 
𝑋𝑏, 𝑋𝑠 that intervals uniformly between 0 and 1. This way, the model is following the 
article by Armstrong (2006). In addition, this model adds a sensitivity for buyer towards 
the cost of entering to the platform this is denoted with 𝑇𝑏, and with 𝑇𝑠 for sellers. Thus, 
the total “cost” that the buyers and sellers are considering are respectively 𝑇𝑏 ∗ 𝑋𝑏 and 
𝑇𝑠 ∗ 𝑋𝑠 while making the decision of entering to the platform, where 𝑋𝑏 is the actual cost. 
Thus, the expected utility (𝑈𝑏 , 𝑈𝑠) is captured in following the utility functions for the 
users on the sides of the market: 
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 𝑈𝑏 =  𝑉𝑏 − 𝑝 − 𝐹𝑏 − 𝑋𝑏 ∗ 𝑇𝑏, if a buyer enters tor the platform and finds 
a match where 𝑝 is the price agreed with the seller. 
 𝑈𝑏 =  −𝐹𝑏 − 𝑋𝑏 ∗ 𝑇𝑏, if a buyer enters to the platform and does not find 
a match 
 𝑈𝑏 = 0, if a buyer does not enter to the platform 
And, for sellers: 
 𝑈𝑠 =  p − 𝑉𝑠 − 𝐹𝑠 − 𝑋𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑠 
 𝑈𝑠 =  −𝐹𝑠 − 𝑋𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑠 
 𝑈𝑠 = 0 
Platform has a cost for serving its clients the buyers and the sellers and costs are de-
noted as 𝐶𝑏and 𝐶𝑠 respectively. Both 𝐶𝑏 and 𝐶𝑠 can be assumed to be non-negative. The 
platforms profit maximization function is the following: 
 max
𝐹𝑏,𝐹𝑠
𝜋 = (𝐹𝑏 − 𝐶𝑏)𝑁𝑏 + (𝐹𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠)𝑁𝑠,  
Here it is assumed that the matching will involve costs (𝐶𝑏 and 𝐶𝑠) for the platform re-
gardless whether there is a match or not.  
The time in the model is divided in stages. In the first stage the platform decides the 
cost of entering to the platform with setting the entrance fees 𝐹𝑏 and 𝐹𝑠. The buyers and 
sellers then simultaneously decide if they want to pay the fee and enter to the platform. 
The 𝐹𝑏 and 𝐹𝑠  thus, determinate the 𝑁𝑏 and 𝑁𝑠. In the second stage the buyers and sellers 
now use the services of the platform trying to find a match. First the sellers post their 
prices simultaneously when entering the platform.  
The equilibrium for each stage will be found with a backward induction. Frictional 
matching stage presented by Burdett, Shi & Wright (2001) serves as the premise of solv-
ing the demands 𝑁𝑏 and 𝑁𝑠.  
With 𝑁𝑏 buyers and 𝑁𝑠 sellers engaging in trade via a platform, in a symmetric equi-
librium every byer has a probability of 
1
𝑁𝑠
 of visiting a specific seller. This causes that all 
the sellers announce same price 𝑝 for their goods: 























, where 𝑉𝑏 − 𝑝 is the buyer’s 
surplus and 𝑝 − 𝑉𝑠 seller’s surplus. (Burdett et al. 2001, 1068). 
Next equation (9) represents the expectation on the number of matches: 
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The price 𝑝 can be rewritten as: 
 𝑝 = 𝑧𝑉𝑏 + (1 − 𝑧)𝑉𝑠 , 
where z is: 















 ∈ (0 , 1) 
Each match will provide a total surplus based on the different valuations of the good: 
 𝑉 =  𝑉𝑏 −  𝑉𝑠 
And, the values for the buyer and seller are: 
  𝑉𝑏 − 𝑝 = (1 − 𝑧)𝑉 
 𝑝 −  𝑉𝑠 = 𝑧𝑉 
Here it can be seen that the term 𝑧 determinates the value for the seller from a success-
ful match. The 𝑧 is a function of 𝑁𝑏 and 𝑁𝑠, and as it falls between (0 , 1) it can be de-
ducted that the share of the surplus depends on the relative numbers of both the buyers 
and sellers on the platform. (Chen & Huang 2012, 632). In some two-sided market cases 
this is very logical as it can greatly affect the bargaining positions of the sides of the 
market. The surplus share is determinate in changes of the price 𝑝 of the goods. It can be 
shown from equation 4 that if 𝑉𝑠 is held constant, the rise in the number of the sellers 𝑁𝑠 
compared to buyers 𝑁𝑠 would lower the price 𝑝. The opposite would apply in case the 
number of buyers would rise compared to the number of sellers. This can be demonstrated 
by taking the derivatives of the function. The negative externalities to agent’s own side 
makes sense in some examples. For instance, in a public auction it is logical that a high 
number of sellers (items) would lower the prices if there were only a few interested buy-
ers.  
Now, this model takes a closer look at some properties that the number of agents have 
towards the price of the goods and the number of successful matches. There is an expected 
number of matches 𝑀(∗) which is dependent on the 𝑁𝑠 and 𝑁𝑏. It is obvious that if the 
matching mechanism is efficient the number of agents on the opposite side of the platform 
will increase the chances of finding a suitable match while the number of agents on the 
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same side of platform decreases the 𝑀(∗). The expected number of matches for the buyers 
and sellers can be taken from the matching function equation (9), by taking the first order 
conditions: 




















It can be noted that both first order conditions are positive as long as 𝑁𝑏 and 𝑁𝑠 are 
greater than zero. All the second order conditions (𝑀𝑏𝑏, 𝑀𝑠𝑠 and 𝑀𝑏𝑠) are positive as well. 
The changes in 𝑀(∗) for the sides of the platform are noted on this study with notation 
𝐾𝑖, also called arrival rate. It is a function of the expected matches 𝑀(∗) with respect to 
the number of the agents 𝑁𝑏 and 𝑁𝑠 such as: 
 𝐾𝑖(𝑁𝑏 , 𝑁𝑠) ≡
𝑀(∗)
𝑁𝑖
 , where 𝑖 = 𝑏, 𝑠 
Now by combining the previous equations (1),(2),(4) and (13), the expected 𝑉𝑏 and 𝑉𝑠 
of the buyers and sellers in 𝑉𝑏(∗) and 𝑉𝑠(∗)can be captured respectively: 
 𝑉𝑏(∗) = (𝑉𝑏 − 𝑝(𝑁𝑏, 𝑁𝑠)𝐾𝑏(𝑁𝑏, 𝑁𝑠) 
 𝑉𝑠(∗) = (𝑝(𝑁𝑏 , 𝑁𝑠) − 𝑉𝑠)𝐾𝑠(𝑁𝑏, 𝑁𝑠) 
The expected values determinate the agents’ willingness to participate in the platform. 
 Then, the expected values can be added to the utility functions of the buyers and 
sellers to capture this information: 
 𝑈𝑏 = 𝑉𝑏(∗) − 𝐹𝑏 − 𝑁𝑏𝑋𝑏 
 𝑈𝑏 = 𝑉𝑠(∗) − 𝐹𝑠 − 𝑁𝑠𝑋𝑠 
These two utility functions now take in account both the positive cross-network effects 
and the negative within-group network effects. With the positive and negative externali-
ties, the platforms’ task to set the fees is more complicated than when the negative exter-
nalities are absent. 
Now, that the demand functions for the agents are defined, the platforms pricing prob-
lem can be more closely analyzed. The agents will join the platform if the utility:  
 𝑉𝑖(∗), 𝑖 = (𝑏, 𝑠)  
is greater than the cost:  
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  𝐹 + 𝑇𝑏𝑋𝑏.  
If the agents were homogenous regards joining the platform, the crucial utility would 
simply be 𝑉𝑖(∗) = 𝐹. However, that would not be “realistic”, at least in this model, as 
then there would exist a fee 𝐹 such that suddenly every agent would simultaneously join 
the platform while with too large 𝐹 none would do that. As it is assumed that the 𝑋 is 
distributed between 0 and 1, there must exist an 𝑋𝑏(∗) so that:  
 𝑉𝑏 − 𝑝 − 𝐹𝑏 = 𝑇𝑏𝑋𝑏(∗)  
so that the utility is zero, and an equivalent 𝑋𝑠 for the sellers’ side: 
  𝑝 − 𝑉𝑠 − 𝐹𝑠 = 𝑇𝑠𝑋𝑠(∗)  
Then those agents, whose 𝑋𝑖 is lower than 𝑋𝑖(∗) the cost would join the platform while 
those with higher would not. This means that the number of agents on the sides 𝑁𝑏 and 
𝑁𝑠 are dependent on the prices respectively: 








Now, the functions 18 and 19 can be modified to be with the subject of the entry fees 𝐹𝑏 
and 𝐹𝑠 such that the profit maximization function can be rewritten as: 
 max
𝐹𝑏,𝐹𝑠
𝜋 = (𝐹𝑏 − 𝐶𝑏)𝑁𝑏(𝐹𝑏 , 𝐹𝑠) + (𝐹𝑠 − 𝐶𝑠)𝑁𝑠(𝐹𝑏 , 𝐹𝑠),  
Then the platform maximizes its entry fees with: 
 𝐹𝑏 = 𝐶𝑏 +
𝑇𝑏
𝑁
𝑁𝑏 − (𝑉𝑏𝑠(∗)𝑁𝑠 + 𝑉𝑏𝑏(∗)𝑁𝑏) 
 𝐹𝑠 = 𝐶𝑠 +
𝑇𝑠
𝑁




 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑠𝑖(∗) =  
𝑑𝑉𝑏(∗)
𝑑𝑁𝑖
 , 𝑖 ∈ (𝑏, 𝑠). They represent the derivatives 
of the utilities of the buyers and seller with respect to the number of participants in the 
platform. In the equilibrium, the number of participants and matches will be: 








𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑁𝑖(∗) = 𝑁𝑠(𝐹𝑏(∗), 𝐹𝑠(∗), 𝑖 = (𝑏, 𝑠) 𝑀𝑏 =  
𝑑𝑀𝑏
𝑑𝑁𝑏
> 0, 𝑀𝑠 =
𝑑𝑀
𝑑𝑁𝑠
> 0  
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In comparison, Armstrong (2006) has the equilibrium fees of  
 𝐹𝑏 = 𝐶𝑏 +
𝑇𝑏
𝑁
𝑁𝑏 − 𝑎𝑠𝑁𝑠 , 𝑎𝑠 > 0 
 𝐹𝑠 = 𝐶𝑠 +
𝑇𝑏
𝑁
𝑁𝑠 − 𝑎𝑏𝑁𝑏 , 𝑎𝑏 > 0 
where 𝑎𝑠 and 𝑎𝑏 are parameters for cross-group externalities. However, the model by 
Chen and Huang (2012) that is followed here, captures not only the cross-group positive 
externalities but the negative within-group externalities, as well.  
With negative externalities taken into the account, the entry fees on one side are higher 
than with only positive externalities accounted. Adding the negative within-group exter-
nalities can make sense. The higher entry fees would scare away the competition from 
agent’s own side of the platform. It is also consisted with the fact that if there are any 
subsidies from the platform towards either side of the platform, it is almost always the 
buyers that are subsidized with zero to negative entry fees. It is logical in many scenarios 
as a buyer would not often care if there are other buyers in the platform as the changes in 
demand does not significantly change price and thus, the buyers have low to none nega-
tive within-group externalities. For instance, not many people are avoiding a mall even if 
there are a lot of people shopping. However, a specialized shop might choose not to open 
there if they know that there is a lot of competition already. This means that the subsidies 
towards one side of the market could be also explained with the negative within-group 
externalities, or more precisely, with the lack of them.  
However, the model may not often be applicable. The assumption of a complete ho-
mogeneity towards the goods within the sides of the market narrows out a lot of empirical 
examples. At least when the buyers are consumers it would rarely be a relevant case. 
However, with a pure B2B platform this might be possible. An example would be for 
instance esteel.com where agents can trade raw materials via a platform. The standard 
explanation where the side with higher elasticity towards the entry fee is subsided is still 
valid and would also apply in the same cases. It remains as a more relevant explanation 
although and can always coexist with the negative within-group externalities.  
3.3 Two competing two-sided market platforms  
In the previous chapters, I analyzed two cases of monopoly platforms. First a model that 
would be suitable for instance to credit card industry, while the second one would be 
relevant for a matchmaking service. I will now look at a situation where there are two 
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competing two-sided platforms. This is a more relevant case in the real world. There is 
often at least some competition even if one platform is very dominant and very close to a 
monopoly. For example, Google, with all its dominance as an online search tool, it still 
has some smaller competitors. Also, the platforms can often create local monopolies but 
still face competition. For example, a shopping mall could often have a local monopoly 
while at the same time compete with other distant malls for the customers that live be-
tween them.  
In most cases there is at least some competition between different platforms. In an 
early phase of adapting a new technology or an innovation which facilitates a platform to 
operate, there can be a fierce competition between the upcoming platforms. One example 
would be the online booking agents. During the last decade there have emerged tens of 
platforms and vast amounts of resources have been put into the advertising by the biggest 
platforms. Strategies of the competition are discussed more in detail later in this article 
but first it is reasonable to analyze a model of the competition. This subchapter will have 
a look on a model of platform competition. All the models in this chapter are derived 
from the theory in the article by Rochet & Tirole (2003). The first two models were based 
on articles that used Rochet & Tirole as a base with either new ideas or point of views 
added to the previous work. The main source for the model in this subchapter however, 
is the actual Rochet & Tirole’s (2003) article. 
The model in this subchapter would likely be most suitable for a case where there are 
some chances for multi-homing which means registering in more than one platform. 
However, there are expectations of some sort of cost or other disincentive for multi-hom-
ing. Goods or services sold through the platform would likely be somewhat heterogene-
ous even if it is not a strict requirement. Perhaps a most suitable example would be a 
proprietary platform like an operating system for a computer and the software sold 
through it. However, the implications of this benchmark model are wider as it is shown 
with the examples in the chapter five. 
 The first subchapter was ended on the notion that the price structure in a monopoly 








By the end of this subchapter it will be shown that the structure will stay almost the 
same even if competition is introduced. However, depending on the type of competition 
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some additions come to the price structure. The premise for this competition is a propri-
etary platform competition. A competition between proprietary platforms can often be 
observed in the modern economy. For example, the competition between operating sys-
tems on computers can be considered one. There are a few operating platforms which 
compete with one another and give software developers a possibility to create and sell 
software to the buyers on the other side of the platform. Another example of such a situ-
ation would be the competition between gaming consoles. It is worth noting that in both 
scenarios the likelihood for the buyer side to participate in multiple platforms or to multi-
home is relatively low. Understandably there is a little reason to have two operating sys-
tems or two gaming consoles and thus, it would be much more likely that the sellers 
engage in multi-homing instead by creating different versions of their software suitable 
for other platforms.  










 , where 𝑃𝑏 and 𝑃𝑠 are again the platform's fees for the buyer 
and sellers similarly to the monopoly example.  
The other side of the equation is different as there is competition between multiple plat-
forms. The reason for this lies again mainly in the network effects and in the possibility 
for multi-homing both by the buyers and the sellers. Multi-homing means that an agent 
registers with more than one platform. 
The symbol 𝜎 is an independent variable between (0,1) that indicates the likelihood of 
a user to be loyal to one platform. The users that are registered with only one platform 
are single-homing. Thus, from now on, the term 𝜎 is called single-homing index and it 
derives from a demand function: 






𝑏  , where 𝑖 = 1,2 






𝑏 represents the part of the buyers who 
trade on the platform 𝑖 when their “preferred” seller trades there and 𝑑𝑖
𝑏 
represents the group of buyers who trade on the platform when their 
seller multihomes. 
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If σ is 1 then all the consumers are using only one platform and would not start using 
the other one even if their platform would cease to exist. Of course, some platforms might 
have higher loyalty while some others would lose customers quickly. Thus, there could 
be multiple different single-homing indexes in the real-world.  
In the sellers’ case, the model to measure multi-homing is more precise. Their index 
is dependent on the amount of demand in the platforms and on the buyers’ single-home 
index 𝜎. If the 𝜎 is low it means that a high percentage of the buyers multi-home and thus 
the sellers don not need to multi-home to get trading partners. This means that the sellers 
have no independent variable for the single-homing but they are neutral to it and base 
their decisions on the buyers’ decisions on multi-homing.  
In a case where the prices in both platforms are symmetric and have demand from the 
buyer’s side, the sellers will participate in both platforms or neither of them. Also, if the 
prices between the two platforms were equal, for instance in case of a joint ownership 
platforms the situation would correspond the previously presented monopoly situation. 
(Rochet & Tirole 2003, 1000). 
 If the platforms differ in pricing it results in three different types of sellers:  
  𝑈𝑠 ≥ ℙ12 
 ℙ12 > 𝑈𝑠 ≥ 𝑃1  
 𝑈𝑠 < 𝑃1 where 𝑈𝑠 is the sellers’ utility from a platform they choose to 
trade in, 𝑃1 is the price for the cheaper one. ℙ12 is the point where the 
tradeoff between trading only in one platform and with both is zero.  
The sellers who satisfy the equation (5), will trade on both platforms. The sellers 
whose utility correspondence the equation (6) will trade only on the cheaper platform. 
The sellers from the equation (7) will not trade at all. 
The ℙ12 is a key point in this model. It is the point where the sellers with greater utility 
will multi-home and those with lower will trade in only one platform or neither of the 
platforms depending if their utility is also below the cheaper platform. It comes from the 
following equation: 











 , where 𝑃1
𝑠 and 𝑃2
𝑠 are the platforms prices to-
wards the sellers 
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𝑏), the terms represent buyers’ 
likelihood being loyal towards a platform or a specific seller. Thus, the term ℙ is reflect-
ing on the buyers’ willingness to use different platforms when the seller they like is using 






















𝑏 < 0 
From the first order conditions with respect the sellers’ fees collected by the platforms, 
it can already be determined that when the more expensive platform rises it prices, the 
parameter ℙ12 rises causing more sellers to choose to trade only on platform number one. 
On the other hand, when the lower priced platform one rises its fees, more sellers start 
participating in both platforms instead of just stopping the trading all together.  
The derivative with respect to 𝐷1






























>  0 
Now it can be seen that the first order condition is clearly positive which is logical if 
the buyers are willing to trade on the seller’s preferable platform the sellers have less need 
to multi-home and thus, the parameter ℙ12 rises. Now the rest of the first order conditions 






























< 0, unless 𝐷1
𝑏 = 𝑑1
𝑏 
Now, it is possible to see from the first order conditions that they are both generally 
negative, meaning that if the buyers trade with sellers who multi-home the value of ℙ12 
goes down as it is beneficial to multihome. Logically, if multi-homing gets the sellers 
more matches they are likely to practice it. Interestingly the equation 12 shows how no 
seller would multi-home if the buyers are as willing to trade in the sellers’ preferable 
platforms as they are with the ones who multi-home. The second equation number 13 
shows that if those buyers who prefer the cheaper platform are as willing to use the sellers’ 
preferable platform, the ℙ12would go to zero and all the sellers that trade would multi-
home.  
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Now, to find a pricing equilibrium, it is necessary to first define the platform’s profit 
structure. The assumption here is that both platforms have a universal cost for serving 
clients and they can post fees for the buyers and sellers who enter the platform. Therefore, 
platforms’ 1 and 2 have the following profit functions: 
  𝜋1 = (𝑃1
𝑏 + 𝑃1
𝑠 − 𝑐)𝑄1 
  𝜋2 = (𝑃2
𝑏 + 𝑃2
𝑠 − 𝑐)𝑄2 
The total price charged by a platform is 𝑃𝑖
𝑏 + 𝑃𝑖
𝑠 = 𝑃𝑖 and the first order conditions of 













To construct the pricing the platforms, the demand functions for the both platforms 
must be analyzed. In the proprietary platform case, the demand functions for the platform 
1 and 2 are respectively the following: 






𝑠) − 𝐷𝑠(ℙ12)) 




When looking the scenario where 𝑃1  < 𝑃2 , the functions for the platforms 1 and 2 yield 
the following equations: 




𝑠) − 𝐷𝑠(ℙ12)) 
  𝑄2 = 𝑑
𝑏(𝑃𝑏)𝐷𝑠(ℙ12) 
Here the term 𝔻𝑏 is an equilibrium point for 𝐷𝑖
𝑏. In symmetric pricing situation 𝐷1
𝑏 =
𝐷2
𝑏 = 𝔻𝑏 and also, 𝜎1 = 𝜎2 = σ = 2 −
𝔻𝑏
𝑑𝑏
 .  
If the prices were to be symmetric: 𝑃𝑖
𝑠 = 𝑃𝑠, 𝑃𝑖
𝑏 ≡ 𝑃𝑠, the demand would simply be: 
  𝑄𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖
𝑏(𝑃𝑏 , 𝑃𝑏)𝐷𝑠(𝑃𝑠) 
And its first order condition with respect to 𝑃𝑖









𝑏 , 𝑃𝑏)𝐷𝑠(𝑃𝑠) 
The situation of a symmetric prices equilibrium, where 𝑃1
𝑠 = 𝑃2
𝑠 = 𝑃𝑠 =  ℙ12 =



















































Now, by using the functions 16, 22 and 27, the first order condition is resolved for a 


































𝑏 . In the equilibrium, the second 
term of the equation (29), is the ratio of the brand elasticity of demand for the buyers 𝜇𝜃
𝑏 
which was first presented at the start of this subchapter. The last term in the equation is 
the ratio of elasticity of demand on the sellers’ side of the market. Now, all this results in 









= 𝑃𝑏 + 𝑃𝑠 − 𝑐 
As it can be seen, the price structure in the platform competition model is strikingly 
similar to the monopoly situation on the credit card market. However, it takes into the 
consideration the buyers’ loyalty towards the platforms and towards the specific sellers 
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operating in the platforms. It can be also considered that the monopoly platform of buy-
ers’ elasticity 𝜇𝑏 would consist the terms 𝜇𝜃
𝑏 ∗ 𝜎 making it the total buyer’s elasticity (of 








, where 𝜇𝑏 = 𝜇𝜃
𝑏 ∗ 𝜎 
A platform economy competition of proprietary platforms would fit well in the tech-
nology industries like game consoles or operating systems. The payment card industry 
could also have a similar price structure as the competing proprietary platforms have. 
This makes sense, even if the card users have lower single-homing index, it is not nearly 
as low as for instance with internet matching platforms like online travel booking sites 
where it is almost costless to use multiple platforms. Also, a cashless buyer probably has 
zero loyalty towards shops in a special platform and would probably always go to the 
next shop instead of looking for an ATM when possible. This leaves the sellers in the 
situation where they must multi-home as ended up happing in the proprietary platform 
model. 
The credit card industry example was introduced in the first subchapter and the only 
difference in the price structure was the introduction of the switch fee: 
 𝑅 = 𝑃𝑚 + 𝑃𝑖 − 𝑐, where 𝑅 is the total profit and 
 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑋 
 𝑃𝑚 = 𝑝𝑚 − 𝑋, where 𝑋 is the switch fee 
However, the extra fee does not change the price structure. The symmetric equilibrium 








, where 𝑃𝑏and 𝑃𝑠are equivalent to 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑚 respectively 
What is important to notice on the model in this subchapter, is the buyers’ possible 
preference on a certain platform and their preference on a certain seller. Those are the key 
concepts compared to the monopoly case that will have effects on how the platforms 
compete as well as how the sellers behave in the real world. The fact that some sellers 
can be more popular than others will lead into a situation where the platforms are espe-
cially interested to get those popular ones to use their platform. This can often lead to in 
price discrimination directed to one side of the platform only, the sellers’ side. It works 
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in the way that the platform subsides some popular sellers in expense of the others. Con-
troversially, the non-subsided sellers may benefit as well if the demand towards the plat-
form then rises from the buyers’ side with the new popular sellers on board.  
What is especially interesting here is that the platform is, in a sense, helping in inter-
nalizing the network benefits according to how much network benefits each seller brings 
in to the table. This was brought up in the chapter two when considering the properties of 
two-sided markets. One necessary condition was failure of the Coase theorem. Now, 
when a platform is helping in internalizing the cross-network effects, the Coase theorem 
has clearly failed. Consider a shopping mall as an example. If a new cinema is built inside 
a mall it can draw a lot of new customers that will benefit the rest of the shops, as well. 
If the rent was the same for all the sellers in the mall the cinema owner might consider 
not to start there at all. However, as the mall helps the owner to internalize some of the 
benefits in a form of a targeted discount rent, the cinema owner now wants to build the 
cinema in to that very mall. In the end, the cinema owner's decision will result in more 
customers and increased demand for the rest of the sellers as well. 
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4 COMPETITION BETWEEN INTERNET PLATFROMS 
The model of Rochet & Tirole applies many industries but there is another model that can 
be considered relevant for multiple cases especially those of the internet-based match 
making platform. These internet platforms that offer services like flight or hotel search 
are likely to have an experience of a situation where buyers, loyalty to a seller is practi-
cally zero meaning that all the sellers must multi-home. Also, the buyers would have 
almost infinite elasticity towards pricing as you never see these search engines charging 
the buyer side. This means that the sellers end up paying the whole cost of their platform 
usage while they still must multi-home to stay competitive. Also, with matchmakers, and 
sometimes with other internet platforms, the marginal cost of serving a new customer can 
be very close to zero. These characteristics combined can change the situation of how the 
platforms are competing. Thus, it is appropriate to discuss the other models there are for 
the two-sided markets that can be also relevant, particularly the model by Caillaud and 
Jullien (2003). 
4.1 Internet platforms under exclusive services 
The model analyzed in this chapter, is a Bertrand game which means that the platforms 
are essentially competing by choosing the prices instead of the quantity. In modern eco-
nomics, Bertrand game is rarely considered a valid model. However, with a specific com-
bination of a close to zero marginal cost by the firms and a close zero loyalty by the 
consumers it can be very much valid to consider the situation a game where the game 
starts with the firms choosing the price instead of the quantity. This is good to remember 
when looking at the model, and when later, analyzing why that kind of approach can be 
viable for analyzing this kind of intermediate markets.  
The model starts from the premises where there are two sets of agents that represent 
the sides of the market. Without an intermediary platform, the agents have close to zero 
chance of finding a suitable trading partner. (Caillaud and Jullien 2003, 311). The model 
assumes that there is a unique trading partner on the other side, with whom, the trading is 
profitable for both agents. This could be, for instance, Alibaba or eBay type of service or 
perhaps a hotel search engine. The agents are homogenous and are denoted as 𝑖 = 1,2. If 
two agents are matched they then progress in to a bargaining stage where they decide the 
price of the transaction. The transaction has a net surplus 𝑈 that is shared between the 
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2⁄ ≤ 𝑢1, 𝑢1 + 𝑢2 = 1 
The gross surplus 𝑈 = 1 is the trade surplus between the trading partners minus the pos-
sible fees charged by the platform from the traders. (Caillaud and Jullien 2003, 311). 
As stated above an agent has close to zero chances of finding a trading partner without 
the help of a platform. The platforms in this model offer matching services that increase 
the chance of finding a trading partner to 𝛾 ≤ 1, assuming that both sides of the match 
are registered in the service otherwise the chance is 0. Therefore, by using a platform’s 
matching service an agent has a chance of 𝛾𝑛𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ (0,1) to find a suitable trading partner, 
where 𝛾 efficiency of the platform’s matching technology while the 𝑛𝑖 is the number of 
the agent type-i using the platform. The chance for the user to find a trading partner is 
dependent on the matching technology and the number of users on the other side of the 
market. 
It is assumed here that there are two matchmakers providing the service. The platforms 
are denoted as 𝐼 and 𝐸. Their ability to find matches is equal 𝛾 ≤ 1, but the resulting 
matches may differ. 
It is assumed that there exists a cost for serving the agents type-i 𝑐𝑖. For the model to 
work it must be that the service is efficient: 
 𝛾 > 𝐶 =  𝑐1 + 𝑐2 
The matchmaking platforms notices whenever a transaction is processed. They can also 
verify the types of users that register to the platform. This leaves them two pricing tools 
they can use in the price discrimination. They can set a registration fee 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 where 𝑘 ∈
 (𝐼, 𝐸) that is not restricted to be positive. In fact, as it has been stated earlier, often there 
can be a negative fee for users entering to the platform. These gifts are directed towards 
one side that is seen more valuable for the platform which is the side whose cross-network 
effects are stronger.  
Sometimes it is possible that the transaction fees can be hard to implement. The agents 
can often handle the transaction via some other medium after a successful matching pro-
cess. (Caillaud and Jullien 2003, 322). Platforms can try to avoid this by giving security 
of payment for the buyer. They can also create systems where sellers’ previous transac-
tions are visible for the buyers to create trust for them and an incentive not to bypass the 
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platform. For instance, Alibaba and Upwork are using these systems. With the imple-
mented transaction fees, the total surplus between the trading partners becomes: 
 𝑈 = 1 −  𝑡𝑘  ≥ 0 
It is obvious that the transaction price would not be negative or otherwise even the 
non-matched agents would choose to trade in the platform. The model assumes that the 
value of trade between specific partners remains constant and that it is common 
knowledge for everyone. 




 𝛾𝑢𝑖(1 − 𝑡
𝑘) − 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2 
Now, the model continues in two-phases, where in the first phase, the platforms set 
prices 𝑃 simultaneously. The platforms are restricted from cooperation and neither has 
better knowledge of the other’s intentions. The pricing 𝑃 =  {𝑃𝐼  , 𝑃𝐸  } is public 
knowledge. In a second phase, the users (buyers and sellers) must simultaneously choose 
which matchmakers to register with. There is of course a possibility that some user will 
not register in either of the platforms.  
This subchapter will analyze a situation where the services are exclusive in a way that 
an agent can only register with one platform or none while the next will focus on a situa-
tion where multi-homing is possible. With exclusive services, there is a following distri-
bution of agents across the matchmakers:  
 𝑁 = (𝑛𝑖
𝐼 , 𝑛𝑖
𝐸), 𝑖 = 1,2 , where 𝑛𝑖
𝑘 represents the proportion of agents reg-
istered with 𝑘 
Now, the utility function U can be drawn as following: 
 𝑈𝑖(𝑃, 𝑘, 𝑁) = 𝑛𝑗
𝑘𝛾𝑢𝑖(1 − 𝑡
𝑘) − 𝑝𝑖
𝑘, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
Of course, if a user registers with no platform then simply: 𝑈𝑖(𝑃, 0, 𝑁) = 0. The 
matchmakers profit function looks following: 
 𝜋𝑘(𝑃𝑘, 𝑁) = ∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑘(𝑝𝑖
𝑘 − 𝑐𝑖) +𝑖=1,2 𝛾𝑛1
𝑘𝑛2
𝑘𝑡𝑘   
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As the agents on both sides of the market are a continuous distribution, the situation does 
not exactly correspond a game. However, it is possible to obtain some subgame-perfect 
equilibriums.  
When a type-i agent decides to register with platform k, it means that they must be at 
least as well off than if they had registered with the other matchmaker or if they had 
decided not to register at all. When there is a situation where 𝑛𝑖
𝑘  > 0 then, following 
(Caillaud & Jullien 2003, 313) it is possible to find an equilibrium distribution 𝑁 for a 
pricing system, 𝑃 for all 𝑘 ∈ (𝐼, 𝐸, 0):  
 𝑈𝑖(𝑃, 𝑘, 𝑁) = max
ℎ∈(𝐼,𝐸,0)
𝑈𝑖( 𝑃, ℎ, 𝑁) 
There can be multiple different allocations but the model rules out all the ones with 
increasing demand functions to keep the amount of equilibriums somewhat reasonable. 
Meaning that if 𝑁(∙) is monotone ∀𝑘, 𝑛𝑖
𝑘(𝑃𝑘, 𝑃−𝑘) is non-increasing in 𝑃𝑘. The mono-
tonicity however, is not restrictive. For instance, there is no restriction when the platform 
employs price discrimination towards its users. Thus, there is no monotonicity when 
𝑃1
𝑘  increases 𝑃2
𝑘 and decreases.  
The monotonicity is there mainly to restrict the users into Pareto non-dominated allo-
cations. The equilibrium in this model is constructed by the price and the user distribution 
(𝑃∗, 𝑁(∙)). The equilibrium user distribution 𝑁(∙), is a monotone market allocation. The 
equilibrium price 𝑃∗ on the other hand, is a Nash equilibrium of reduced pricing game of 
the 𝑁(∙) allocation with profits 𝜋𝑘(𝑃, 𝑁(𝑃)) (Caillaud & Jullien 2003, 314). 
So, the equilibrium is formed from a set of prices charged by the matchmakers and of 
a formula describing how the users make choices among them. The user allocations create 
a sort of a demand functions for each platform. After this the model develops into a clas-
sical price setting game or a Bertrand game. In the model, it is assumed that all the users 
act rationally and have rational expectations on how the others will allocate themselves. 
This, of course, has a great impact on the model making the resulting equilibrium most 
likely more efficient. However, it would be very complex to create a model where not all 
the users act rationally. It is also important to remember that the general result of the 
Bertrand pricing game is that products and services are sold at the marginal cost.  
In a competition situation with exclusive services, a high concentration of users to-
wards one platform can be expected. Since the users can register with maximum one 
platform, the only efficient allocation would require everyone to register with the same 
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matchmaker. In the article, Caillau & Jullien come to the conclusion that in the competi-
tion between exclusive services all equilibria are efficient and only involve one platform. 
This afore described dominant firm equilibria in the price system (𝑃𝐼 , 𝑃𝐸) is maintained 
by a pessimistic market allocation against 𝑃𝐸  which means that the users expect no other 
users to register with E.  
 𝛾𝑢𝑖(1 − 𝑡
𝐼) − 𝑝𝑖
𝐼 ≥ −𝑝𝑖
𝐸  𝑖 = 1,2 
The model assumes that the cost 𝑐𝑖 is related to the service in general rather than to the 
transaction.  
The model is created with assumption that the agents may have pessimistic beliefs 
towards one platform. Now, no user will join the platform 𝐸 when there are pessimistic 
expectations towards it and will instead choose platform 𝐼. This means that in a dominant 
firm equilibrium, there can thus be only one firm that operates with profit, and if no pric-
ing strategy is used then one firm is not active as all the users see the other one as the 
dominant.  
However, the platform 𝐸 can adopt some tactics in order to change the situation. The 
platform 𝐸 can start subsidizing the i-users such that: 
  𝑝𝑖
𝐸 < 𝑝𝑖
𝐼 −  𝛾𝑢𝑖(1 − 𝑡
𝐼)  ≤ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2 
Now, all the i-type users will register platform E and it can set the pricing for the j-users 
so that it is beneficial for them to trade in the platform: 
 𝑝𝑗
𝐸 +  𝛾𝑢𝑗𝑡
𝐸 <  𝛾𝑢𝑗 + (𝑝𝑗
𝐼 , 0) 
The i-type users will now want to collect the registration subsidy and as j-type users know 
that all the i-type users will register to the platform 𝐸, they will also register with the 𝐸 
as it is cheaper to trade there. The platform can maximize the transaction fee from the i-
type users as that does not appear in the equation 𝑡𝐸 = 1.  
However, the platform 𝐼 can use the same pricing to stop the platform 𝐸’s tactics. 
Therefore, it is now possible to determinate the only equilibrium with exclusively ser-
vices. The platform, that has the positive expectations, will capture all the users and 




𝑘) = 𝑐 − 𝛾. 
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The reason for zero profit is following. A non-dominant platform could always offer 
the users a registration subsidy a bit bigger than their utility on the dominant platform 
conquering all the users and becoming the dominant platform. Thus, in the equilibrium 
the dominant matchmaker must return all the surplus to its users normally through the 
registration subsidy. This can also be shown mathematically. Assume two firms, 𝐸 and 𝐼, 
in an equilibrium with surplus: 




for i-type users. With this equilibrium, the firm’s profits are: 
 𝜋𝑘 = 𝛾𝑛1
𝑘𝑛2
𝑘 −  ∑ (𝑐𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖)𝑛𝑖
𝑘
𝑖 ≥ 0 
Now firm k could use a subsidy and capture the whole market with a profit of: 
 𝛾 − 𝑐 − 𝑠1 − 𝑠2 − ∑ 𝛾𝑢𝑖(1 − 𝑡
𝑘)𝑛𝑗
−𝑘 ≤ 𝜋𝑘𝑖  
This means that there is no possibility for a platform to make a constant profit in the 
market. It also means that almost always there is only one active platform in the market. 
The only other equilibrium is 𝑛𝑖
𝑘 = 1 2⁄ , 𝑡
𝐼 = 𝑡𝐸 = 0, 𝑝𝑖
𝐸 = 𝑝𝑖
𝐼 , 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 = 𝑐 where there 
is still no profit and the equilibrium is inefficient, as well. This would mean that all the 
users are split the same way and exactly half and half. The idea here is that now there 
should be no pessimistic beliefs towards either compared to the other. 
Although, the situation of exclusive services is hard to find in the real world, charac-
teristics where one platform is thriving with a majority market share while being weary 
of new comers is common. Many Internet platforms do not charge the buyers at all and 
sometimes even subsidize them. It has also been seen how users tend to gravitate towards 
the expected winner platform. For instance, MySpace was quickly abandoned in favor of 
Facebook ten years ago even though the service was very similar. Years after, Google, 
with all their resources, has not been able to popularize its own Google+ service.  
Sometimes the platform might require exclusivity from the seller side meaning that 
the buyers are able to multi-home but sellers not. This is possible when there is for in-
stance intellectual property that can be licensed. One example would be the streaming 
services such as Netflix, Hulu or HBO not selling some of their content to their competi-
tors and thus requiring exclusivity on the seller side. However, it is not clear that these 
streaming services are in fact two-sided markets, although they are often lumped with 
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them in non-scientific publications. The reason is that they buy the services from the 
sellers and fund their sellers’ production instead of just acting as an intermediary. 
4.2 Competition with Multi-homing possibilities 
As stated earlier, it is hard to find an industry where there would be a complete exclusivity 
for the intermediation platforms. Thus, it is important to see a situation, where users on 
either side of the market can register with multiple platforms and use them simultane-
ously. A situation where multi-homing is possible was already analyzed in the chapter 4 
about platform completion. That model mirrored a model by Rochet & Tirole where there 
was a multi-homing index that measured the overall likelihood in that market for multi-
homing. In the model by Caillaud & Jullien, the proportion of multi- and single-homers 
is also present. The model puts more focus on the question when it is efficient for the 
agents to multi-home. This subchapter will present some equilibriums and strategies that 
might occur in the platform competition in Caillaud & Jullien’s model.  
The model itself derives from the previous model. The setup is the same with rational 
agents on both sides of the platform looking for a unique trading partner from the other 
side. Two platforms are competing with one another and the equilibriums are results of a 
pricing game such as before. 
It is important to understand why and when the user registers with more than one plat-
form. Even if a user-i expects all the j-users to engage in multi-homing, the user type-i 
will have still have an incentive to do so, as well. They increase their chances of finding 
a match by (1 −  𝛾)𝛾. This is the result of the fact that the matching is not perfect and 
thus, one platform can fail to find a match while the other one succeeds. The additional 
benefit of registering in multi-homing is that in case of a double match 𝛾2 the user can 
choose on which platform conduct the trade and possibly then get a lower transaction 
price. Between these two there is an important difference that the first one adds value into 
the economy as whole by increasing the trade, while the second does not have any impact 
on the efficiency and is merely increasing the agents’ surplus by taking it from the plat-
forms.  
In this model, there are two types of efficient market allocations. The first one where 
it is beneficial to register with a second platform after having registered with one, and 
another market allocation where single-homing is efficient. Now, the market allocation 
is defined as: 
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  𝑁 = (𝑛𝑖
𝐼 , 𝑛𝑖
𝐸 , 𝑛𝑖
𝑚 ), where 𝑛𝑖
𝐼 , 𝑛𝑖
𝐸  are the users single-homing while the 
𝑛𝑖
𝑚 are the users that engage in multi-homing. 
The outcome depends on the cost 𝑐 relation to the improved matching efficiency: 
(1 −  𝛾)𝛾. 
 When (1 −  𝛾)𝛾 < 𝑐 the efficient allocation requires single-homing, 
where all i will choose one platform with positive expectations, in this 
case  𝑛𝑖
𝐼 = 1.  
 On the other hand, if (1 −  𝛾)𝛾 > 𝑐 the efficient equilibrium requires 
global multi-homing, where all i register with both platforms 𝑛𝑖
𝑚 = 1. 
There are two kinds of outcomes in this model, the pure equilibrium outcomes where 
the agents register deterministically with one or both platforms and mixed equilibriums 
where some agents can make different choices ex ante and ex post. 
To start it is best to continue with the same premises that were exposed in the previous 
subchapter. Accordingly, there is a pessimistic market allocation against the platform 𝐸 
meaning that users are expected to register with 𝐼. In this scenario, the best strategy for 𝐸 
is to use a divide and conquer strategy to gain market share by subsidizing the i users. 
Divide and conquer strategy or DC strategy is a term that comes from the article by Cail-
laud & Jullien 2003. The idea is simply to subsidize a one side to get the other side too 
and, it is basically what the platform 𝐸 was applying in the previous subchapter when 
trying to win the competition.  
The structure on the model is the same as in the exclusive model so the maximum 





𝑘 is the registration fee for i-type users and 
𝛾𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖
𝑘 is the probability of a profitable match for a user i.  
Now, as the assumption is that the platform 𝐼 is the preferred one the users will always 
register with it. If the registration fee is more zero 𝑝𝑖
𝐸 > 0, the users will only register 
with the 𝐼. To change this situation, the platform 𝐸 can lower the price so that 𝑝𝑖
𝐸 < 0. 
Then, all the users i will register with platform 𝐸 to collect the subsidy while at the same 
time they maintain their registration with platform 𝐼. They will not cancel yet their regis-
tration with the 𝐼, as they do not know if the users from group j will follow them. If this 
happens, the platform 𝐸 will still not make any profit as it cannot process the match or 





𝐼 or if 
 𝑟𝑗
𝐸 ≥ 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑢𝑗 + 𝛾
2𝑢𝑗 max(𝑡
𝐼 , 𝑡𝐸).  
In the first scenario, the j-users will not register with E because the total fees with the 
platform 𝐼 are lower. In the second case (6), the users will not multi-home because the 
expected utility of multi-homing is lower than the cost of registration with the second 
platform. The both cases lead to a single-homing equilibrium: 
 𝑛𝑗
𝐼 = 𝑛𝑖
𝑚, where only one platform is active.  
It is important to note how this model does not capture any possible within-group neg-
ative externalities like some of the models in the third chapter. There is no benefit of 
being the only user of certain type in the platform. If there was, it could be assumed that 
some agents could try to avoid competition and thus, any single-homing equilibriums 
might not exist and there would be more room for different multi-homing equilibriums.  
Generally, divide and conquer strategies are no more available for the platforms as the 
users do not have to make any decision between the platforms. Thus, in the model the 
type-i users should register with platform 𝐸 always if 𝑝𝑖
𝐸 < 0. However, the maximum 
profit from type-j users is strictly limited with the conditions 5 and 6 such that: 
 𝑟𝑗
𝐸 < max(𝑟𝑗
𝐼; 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑢𝑗 + 𝛾
2𝑢𝑗 max(𝑡
𝐼 , 𝑡𝐸)) 
The equation 8 is the maximum when all the i register with the platform 𝐼. Depending 
on j-type users’ behavior, the platform 𝐸 has three different divide & conquer strategies 
to apply. These strategies to lead in an equilibrium, multi-homing must be efficient. In 
the first option the platform is looking to be a second source for the users. This situation 
can occur if the transaction price of the platform 𝐸 is higher tI < tE, then 𝐸 only con-
cludes a transaction when the platform 𝐼 fails the match and its profits are bounded by 
(1 −  γ)γ − c as the maximum profit. This is also the surplus generated by multi-homing. 
Therefore, it is also clear that if multi-homing is not efficient there is no possibility for a 
second source platform to operate.  
The second possible strategy occurs when 𝐸 has a lower transaction price tI > tE, then, 
the platform 𝐸 is a primary source of transactions and conducts the transaction whenever 
there is a match. This reverses the previous roles if there is a global multi-homing mean-




𝐼 ≤ 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑢ℎ + 𝛾
2𝑢ℎ max(𝑡
𝐼 , 𝑡𝐸) (Caillaud & Jullien 2003, 317) 
This means that the platform 𝐼 has now adopted the role of a second source as the multi-
homing continues to be globally efficient. 
The third DC strategy is possible if there is a population of users that do not register 
with 𝐼, 𝐸 acts as the sole platform for these users. The fact that 𝐸 can act as a sole plat-
form, is also the reason why the primary source example does not include a situation 
where some users would prefer 𝐸 over 𝐼.  
The key to evaluate which one of the DC strategy is viable for a platform in this model 
depends heavily on the users’ minimum surplus they get from the platform acting as a 
second source. The minimum surplus:  








It is beneficial for the users to multi-home only if max(𝑡𝐼 , 𝑡𝐸)  ≥  𝑡𝐼 − 𝑧𝐼. In this case 
𝐸 can act as the first source if also 𝑡𝐼 ≥ 𝑡𝐸  which is only possible if 𝑧𝐼 ≥ 0. If 𝑧𝐼 < 0 the 
options for the platform 𝐸 are to act as a second source or to act as the sole source for the 
population that does not register with 𝐼. To sum all this up, there are two scenarios: 
 If 𝑧𝐼 ≥ 0, 𝐸 can use the first source strategy with 𝑡𝐼 = 𝑡𝐸or the second 
source strategy. 
 If 𝑧𝐼 < 0, 𝐸 can use the sole source strategy with 𝑡𝐸 = 𝑡𝐼 − 𝑧𝐼 or the 
second source strategy.  
The profit for acting as the first source or as a sole source is: 
 𝜋𝐹 = 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑢2 + 𝛾(𝑢1 + 𝛾𝑢2)𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑐. (Caillaud & Jullien 2003, 317) 
The expectation here is that the group 2 is the one that is multi-homing globally. In 
this model, the expectation is that the users in the better bargaining position will multi-
home. And the profit for the second source strategy: 
 𝜋𝑆 =  𝛾(1 − 𝛾) − 𝑐.  
As the equations (11) and (12) suggest, a platform has the option to act as a second 
source with the profit from equation (14) with a slightly negative registration fee and a 
transaction fee of 1 provided that multi-homing is efficient. (Caillaud & Jullien 2003, 
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324). It seems that the higher the matching efficiency, the better it is to be the first source 
compared to the second source. 
With the pricing from (13) and (14), the users will always benefit 𝛾𝑢𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖
𝐼 ≥ 0 if they 
all register with both the platforms. In this case, the platform 𝐸 is clearly a second source. 
In a situation where 𝑧𝐼 ≥ 0, the expected market allocation is the one, where all the users 
register with 𝐼 for all 𝑃𝐸 . However, 𝐸 has an option to act as a first source by setting the 
prices such that for some 𝑖, 𝑡𝐸 <  𝑡𝐼 , 𝑝𝐸 < 0, and with revenue capped from j-type users 
such that: 
  𝑟𝑗
𝐸 ≤ max (𝑟𝑗
𝐼 , 𝛾𝑢𝑗(1 − 𝛾 + 𝛾𝑡
𝐼)) = 𝛾𝑢𝑗(1 − 𝛾 + 𝛾𝑡
𝐼).  
Then, the profits come from equation: 
 𝑝𝑖
𝐸 + 𝑝𝑗
𝐸 + 𝛾𝑡𝐸 − 𝑐 < 𝛾𝑡𝐸𝑢𝑖 + 𝛾𝑢𝑗(1 − 𝛾 − 𝛾𝑡
𝐼) − 𝑐.  
The optimal pricing is then to set 𝑡𝐸  as close as possible to 𝑡𝐼 while still maintaining 
the lower transaction price, 𝑡𝐸 <  𝑡𝐼. Meanwhile, with the registration fees 𝑝𝑖
𝐸and 𝑝𝑗
𝐸 set 
as large as possible, the maximum profits are very close to: 
  𝜋𝐹 = 𝛾𝑢1𝑡
𝐼 + 𝛾𝑢2(1 − 𝛾 + 𝛾𝑡
𝐼) − 𝑐, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, 𝑗 = 2. 
To sum it up, when 𝑧𝐼 ≥ 0, the platform 𝐸’s profits are equation (14) or (17) depending 
on which strategy they follow. 
In case of 𝑧𝐼 < 0, the 𝐼 cannot be a second source for being too cheap with the trans-
action costs 𝑡𝐼. However, there is still a possibility that 𝐸 can act as the sole source to a 
group of users. This requires that: 
 𝑝𝑖
𝐸 < 0 
 𝑟𝑗
𝐸 < max(𝑟𝑗
𝐼; 𝛾𝑢𝑗(1 − 𝛾 + 𝛾 max(𝑡
𝐼 , 𝑡𝐸))) 
Obviously, it also requires that either some i or j-users do not register with 𝐼: 
 𝑟𝑖
𝐼 > 𝛾𝑢𝑖(1 − 𝛾 + 𝛾 max(𝑡
𝐼 , 𝑡𝐸)) 
or 
 𝑟𝑗
𝐼 > 𝛾𝑢𝑗(1 − 𝛾 + 𝛾 max(𝑡
𝐼 , 𝑡𝐸)) 
and with a transaction price: 
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 𝑡𝐸 ≤ 𝑡𝐼 − 𝑧𝐼. 
The profit of acting as a sole source come equation: 
 𝑝𝑖
𝐸 + 𝑝𝑗
𝐸 + 𝛾𝑡𝐸 − 𝑐 < 𝛾𝑡𝐸𝑢𝑖 + max(𝑟𝑗
𝐼; 𝛾𝑢𝑗(1 − 𝛾 + 𝛾 max(𝑡
𝐼 , 𝑡𝐸))) −
𝑐. 
Where the optimal transaction price 𝑡𝐸  just below 𝑡𝐼 − 𝑧𝐼 the profits for acting as the only 
source for a group of users are: 
 𝜋𝐿 = 𝛾𝑢1(𝑡
𝐼 − 𝑧𝐼) + 𝛾𝑢2(1 − 𝛾 + 𝛾(𝑡
𝐼 − 𝑧𝐼) − 𝑐, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, 𝑗 = 2.  
The market allocations in this article fall in two kinds of equilibriums depending on 
how the users act. The first one is a pure equilibrium where all the users from the same 
groups act in the same way. The other one is a mixed equilibrium where the users make 
different choices. In the pure equilibrium case, the market allocations are quite straight 
forward. If the cost serving the users is lower than the value created acting as a second 
source 𝛾(1 − 𝛾) > 𝑐, there will be a global multi-homing 𝑛1
𝑚 = 𝑛2
𝑚 = 1. Otherwise, 
there is a dominant firm equilibrium 𝑛1
𝑘 = 𝑛2
𝑘 = 1. In the case of the global multi-homing, 
the two firms have different roles. The first one acts as a second source with high trans-
action fee and low registration fee while the other is the first source with a primary plat-
form for transactions and high restoration fees. This is an equilibrium that also requires 
that the matching technology is not efficient 𝛾 = 1. Otherwise, the second platform serves 
for no purpose. 
 In a situation of a dominant firm equilibrium, the acting firm will maintain its domi-
nance by setting the transaction fee to zero and making profit with the registrations fees. 
This makes it impossible for the other platform to enter to the market as 𝛾(1 − 𝛾) ≤ 𝑐 
makes no room for a second source in the market. This also means that the dominant firm 
cannot make any profit on the market either: 
 𝜋𝐷 =  
(𝛾−𝑐)
𝑢1+𝛾𝑢2
(1 − 𝛾)𝑢1 ≤ 𝑐 
The dominant firm’s profits are capped to zero. The threat of the non-active firm con-
quering the market is so big that the active platform must make zero profit. While this 
may seem unexpected, it resembles the situation where the services are exclusives and 
the profits vanish as well. So, in the pure equilibrium with a dominant firm implies that 
in a competition between two-sided markets, the monopoly is not always a bad situation 
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for a consumer. This might seem controversial, but it is hard to find examples where 
platforms try to directly profit from the consumers. Instead they charge fees from the 
sellers who are unable to pass those fees to their clients. Also, the two-sided markets do 
not seem have the same monopoly power as one-sided markets. Instead of limiting the 
quantity, they choose a price to sell the maximum amount of services.  
The idea of constant threat of new platforms seems to be real as well. It has been seen 
that many internet platforms like Uber have yet failed to find a way to make consistent 
profits as they must constantly undercut the potential emerging competitors. Meanwhile, 
the consumer benefits from a monopoly as they do not need to register with multiple 
matching platforms to trade. Of course, this would not directly apply to some platforms 
where there are big barriers of entry like high fixed cost for example setting up a shopping 
mall. 
In the case of a global multi-homing the profits are shared between the firms according 
to their contribution to the users. For the second source the profits are simply:  
 𝜋𝑆 = 𝛾(1 − 𝛾) − 𝑐,  
as described in the equation (14). For the first source, it is a bit more as it contributes 
𝛾(1 − 𝛾) and the value of the lowered transaction fees in the case of a double match: 
𝛾2(𝑡𝐸 − 𝑡𝐼) and thus, the total profit for the first source is: 




The both market allocations are efficient. In this equilibrium, the platforms are not 
directly competing with one another as they have different tasks.  
A mixed equilibrium, where the users from the same group make different choices 
always requires multi-homing. The reason is that the platforms would constantly try to 
undercut the prices to conquer the whole market and it would always be beneficial for 
some users to multi-home. In short, there is no equilibrium where no users multi-home 
and it is not beneficial to try to cut the prices. Still, it can be that only one group is multi-
homing in the equilibrium. Assuming the i-users multi-home, the j-users are then single 
homing on the platform with the lowest total price. This means that in the equilibrium 
where both the firms are active the prices for the single-homing group are the same. The 










Neither of the platforms are able to make profit with the single homers with prices of:  
 𝑝𝑗
𝑘 + 𝛾𝑡𝑘 ≤ 𝑐𝑗  
This in turn means that there is no incentive in trying to attract more single-homers. 
Therefore, the profits for the platform are taken from the group that does multi-home and 
that is the one benefitting more related to the cost. Implications on this are that the sellers 
would generally fill this group. 
Thus, it seems that no dominant firm equilibrium brings profits for the platforms. Sym-
metric equilibriums can be profitable. There is a sustainable equilibrium where 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 =
0, 𝑝𝑗
𝑘 =  
𝑢𝑗
2
, 𝑡𝑘 = 0, 𝛾 close being to 1, and market is shared evenly between the two plat-
forms. The type-i users are evenly split between platforms and the j-type users choose to 
multi-home. Neither type is willing to deviate from that equilibrium. However, this still 
requires coordination as either platform could try to capture all the market by lowering 
the 𝑝𝑗
𝑘. To prevent this deviation, the platforms can extract less than 𝑝𝑗
𝑘 =  
𝑢𝑗
2
 from the 
multihoming group or price below the marginal cost for the single-homing group 𝑝𝑖
𝑘 <
𝑐𝑖. (Caillaud & Jullien 2003, 320). 
All in all, the article presents multiple different equilibriums but while theoretically 
possible, not all of them are perhaps realistic. The third subchapter will go through some 
of the implications of this model and starts a discussion about the model’s applications 
within the empirical examples which is further continued in the following chapter. It will 
also start the comparison with the models from the chapter three and this comparison 
continues in the next chapter. 
4.3 The equilibriums; profits & consumer welfare 
As opposed to Rochet & Tirole’s theorem, Caillaud & Jullien’s article treat the two-sided 
market problem as a Bertrand game where there is a continuous demand towards the ser-
vice of the platform and the platforms are only competing with prices. This leads to low 
profits in general for the parties participating in the game. In the original Bertrand game 
equilibrium, the companies will sell the goods at the marginal cost. Every equilibrium of 
the normal Bertrand game are weak as the firms do not lose anything when they are not 
making a profit meaning that there is no reason not to deviate from the equilibrium. This 
is sometimes also called Bertrand paradox, Baye & Morgan (1999). Baye & Morgan also 
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state in their article: “A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games” (1999) that there ex-
ists a continuum of symmetric equilibriums, where firms make profit with mixed strate-
gies in repeated games.  
Interestingly, in this model and in many empiric two-sided market examples, many 
conditions for a Bernard game are in place. The demand is inelastic to an extent, espe-
cially in the buyer side. Marginal cost of serving new clients is zero or close to zero. In 
the case of intermediary, there is also almost no fixed costs for the platforms. The domi-
nant firm market allocations are non-profitable due to the fear of non-active firm entering 
the market and thus, the platform operates at a marginal cost.  
When there are two active platforms competing in the market, there are only two types 
of possible profitable allocations. First, there is the situation of an exact split of the mar-
ket. The second case is perhaps a more probable scenario and can arise when the multi-
homing is efficient. Then, two players fill in different roles with other one setting high 
entry fees and zero transaction fee working as a first source of trade between the sides of 
the market. The other player uses registration fees slightly below zero to capture high 
quantity of users and sets a high transaction fee. The second source platform service is 
used whenever the first source fails the match. When the multi-homing is efficient, the 
market surplus is high and goes to the platform instead of the sides of the market. How-
ever, this is not a traditional Bertrand game as the service offered by the two platforms is 
in fact different. Thus, it can be expected that now the platforms can and will profit in the 
market. 
Controversially, one platform is in effect better for the consumer than multiple com-
peting ones. In the Caillaud & Jullien model, no strategy with only one active firm would 
bring any profits as there is always threat of a market capture by the inactive firm. This 
also means that under exclusivity the consumers enjoy higher surplus than under non-
exclusivity. This is especially clear when matching is efficient or close to efficient. Thus, 
it is important to note that when the matching is efficient an additional market platform 
does not necessarily produce any new surplus.  
However, in their paper, the authors note that the expectations on some platforms’ 
popularity could make them possible to extract profits in the long term. For instance, the 
brand’s name can be powerful enough to keep users loyal for a certain platform even if 
the total price is higher. A great example for this is Amazon, a platform that is now mak-
ing huge revenue and is very well known, only made their first profitable year in 2003 
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six years after their IPO. (Amazon annual report, 2003, 27). Airline online booking com-
panies are another one great example of long sustained losses. A German company 
Trivago was still making loss in 2017, (Trivago annual report 2017, 4) while being estab-
lished already in 2008 almost ten years earlier, making loss was clearly a part of their 
strategy to grow and crowd the market. This case will be discussed later. 
It is also logical to assume that something as a brand loyalty can be built over the time. 
It would be hard for any new platform to enter into a market with already very dominant 
platforms. At least it would require a lot of subsidized selling and continuous advertising 
by the platform. Entry barriers like this may leave the dominant platform “room” to make 
profit. These entry barriers will be discussed in the fifth chapter.  
In the end, the results and implications of the model are not that far from the ones of 
Rochet & Tirole. In both the models there are multiple similar ideas. First, for instance 
being that the competition between platforms is fierce for the users where only few plat-
forms can remain profitable. Secondly, a monopoly situation is not similarly exploited as 
in the one-sided markets, since one goal is to maximize the volume of the trade and sim-
ultaneously beware of new platforms. Thirdly, the pricing structures end up having simi-
larities but for different reasons. While it was the elasticities of demand where the key 
lied in defining the price structure in the model by Rochet & Tirole, it is the bargaining 
position that defines it in the Caillaud & Jullien’s model. In both of the models, it often 
tends to be the seller who is charged more while the buyer side gets a free ride. The next 
chapter will present some examples to shed more light on the implications of these mod-
els. 
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5 EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES OF TWO-SIDED MARKETS 
This chapter will present real-world examples where the two-sided markets can arise ei-
ther alone or to compete with firms operating as one-sided markets. This chapter will 
analyze the examples. The goal is to try to analyze if the examples have properties of the 
models that have been presented in this thesis. Other goal is to figure out which model 
would be the most suitable for the example. These examples also try to illustrate some 
unique economic properties of the two-sided markets and their implications to the sur-
rounding economies. The examples are collected from some scientific articles, from mag-
azines and some other publications.  
First, I will go through an example of a solution for a typical problem that a new plat-
form faces; how to get the both sides initially on board? In the second subchapter, I will 
present some evidence on the usage of the buyer’s subsidies from another research and 
introduce some other real-world strategies the platforms may use in the competition. In 
the following subchapters three, four and five, I will analyze some effects the two-sided 
markets can have to their surrounding economies. Each subchapter has a different point 
of view for the subject. 
5.1 Chicken and egg problem; spread of the credit card 
No consumer would go to a mall with no shops nor would any shop want to install into a 
mall that no shopper visits. The chicken and egg problem is quite unique for the two-
sided markets. It arises due to the characteristic of the demand curves caused by the indi-
rect network externalities on both sides of the platform. To attract buyers, the platform 
had to already have sellers on board and vice versa. (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003, 310.). As 
it has been discussed in previous chapters, the users on one side benefit from the users on 
the other side of the platform. If the only value, a platform produces, is based on cross-
network externalities, it can be difficult to launch a new platform to compete with the 
existing ones or even launch a new one when there are no other platforms competing in 
the market. The premise for this problem to arise, also requires that the platform cannot 
replace the seller side of the market for a time period and act as a one-sided market but 
has to use an existing seller base. An example of an industry where the problem can be 
relieved is the software industry with operation systems as platforms, where many of the 
basic programs are produced by the platform.  
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 The credit card industry is an excellent example that faces the chicken and egg prob-
lem. If there was only one person who has a credit card there would not be much benefit 
for a shop to accept it as they would need a machine to read it and pay a transaction fee 
to the card issuer for the highly unlikely purchase made by the only customer using the 
card. Since no shop accepts the card, there will not be many people willing to get one 
either. This situation would be an example of the chicken and egg problem that a new 
platform might face when launching a service.  
However, a platform has its means to alleviate this problem. As mentioned in the in-
troduction chapter Visa managed to establish itself as the first credit card option for the 
middle class. Their predecessor, Bank of America accomplished this by sending unsolic-
ited credit cards to ordinary US residents. They started by sending unsolicited 60000 
credit cards to the residents of Fresno county in California in 1956. Soon after the suc-
cessful launch, they sent 2 million cards to residents across the California state. This way 
they managed to get a high number of users on one side of the platform and could then 
establish a network of sellers who would accept the card and be willing to pay the trans-
action fees to Bank of America. By the end of the decade Bank of America had over 
20000 merchants that would accept their card. (Nocera, 1994, 23). 
Now, 60 years later we might be witnessing another competition between payment 
platforms as paying with mobile phone is becoming more and more popular. Many major 
banks are launching their own payment system meanwhile, tech companies like Apple 
and Google are also coming to the market with Apple Pay and Google Wallet. While I 
haven’t heard of anyone receiving an unsolicited payment app, the advertising of the pay-
ment apps has become visible in Finland. It will be interesting to see, who can solve the 
chicken and egg problem and capture the new payment market. 
There are other methods to solve the chicken and egg problem as well. Many internet 
platforms are offering signing bonuses for registering users. For instance, both the largest 
Finnish restaurant food delivery firms Wolt and Foodora are known to give free coupons 
for the first-time users to attract them. Many platforms tend to pander the buyers with 
offers instead of the sellers. It is even the case that the buyers can get a negative price 
from the platform. This is due to the price elasticity of the buyer’s side compared to the 
seller’s side which has been discussed in the previous chapters three and four.  
Apart from subsidizing one side of the platform, the two-sided markets rely heavily on 
advertising. I will bring some examples of both of these strategies in the next subchapter. 
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5.2 Travel agents as search engine aggregators; evidence of buyer 
subsidies and market capture 
Even the brick and mortar travel agents have had some of the two-sided market aspects 
when being intermediaries between buyers and sellers in the market. However, a lot of 
their work used to be selling the service and a big part of their job has been bringing 
assurance for the buyer side to make sure they get scammed. Thus, their value as an in-
termediary comes from reducing the asymmetric information between the trading parties. 
Trade assurance can be, of course, a service provided by the two-sided market but these 
intermediaries are mostly linked to the information asymmetry problems that are not a 
subject in this article. The old travel agencies also have large marginal cost of serving 
clients meaning that there exists a clear limit that how many customers they could serve 
at a time making it hard to quickly capture a large share of the market. This makes brick 
and mortar agents inflexible in many ways compared to the online travel agents, for in-
stance they would always have to adjust first the personnel if they would try to change 
the price.  
With the online travel agents, the situation is different though. Online travel agents 
and search engine aggregators are websites that let buyers to perform a search for a flight 
or a hotel to a destination they want to visit with some criteria of the buyer’s choice. The 
buyer will then get many quotations from the platform for flights or hotels with their 
search criteria. If they find what they were looking for they can buy a flight or a hotel via 
the platform. The online travel agents’ search results are drawn from an airline booking 
systems like Sabre or Worldspan that are used by the airlines and show results for the 
consumer (Bilotkach & Rupp 2014, 344). This innovation changes the travel agency’s 
role completely. After initially setting the matchmaking platform, they can serve new 
buyers with almost zero marginal cost. They can also quote vastly higher number of 
sellers than without the technology. This means that there is a large number of cross-
network effects that cannot be internalized between the traders but by the platform. The 
more there are buyers, the more important it is for a specific airline or hotel chain to be 
found in the quotations when a byer performs a search. To present an example of the 
importance of the platforms in the airline industry, the American Airlines revenue de-
clined by 50 million on the first quarter of 2011 or 1.6% of its revenue due to not being 




Due to their nature of the two-sided market, online travel agents have interested the 
research before. In one of the first empirical researches on the two-sided markets, Bilot-
kach & Rupp (2014) found in their research an indication towards buyer subsidies in the 
online travel agent platforms. The whole travel booking industry is very complex with 
price discrimination towards buyers and negotiations between the airline company and 
the intermediary platform. For an intermediary platform to improve its negotiation posi-
tion, it needs a large user base of buyers. The best strategy to achieve this is to make sure 
the buyers find the cheapest price in their webpage. In the end, the value these agents 
offer for the consumer is to save their time in the search for the cheapest and most suitable 
tickets in the market.  
Online travel agents have taken this very seriously and some applied this strategy al-
ready in 2004. Orbitz offered a $ 50 voucher to any customer who would find lower priced 
ticket for identical flight. This price guarantee was quickly adopted by Orbitz competi-
tors. In 2006 Expedia and Travelocity adopted a similar policy even promising refund on 
top of the voucher if a customer found a cheaper ticket than theirs. In 2008, Orbitz went 
even further making the price guarantee automatic so that the customers themselves did 
not have to check if the price was the cheapest. They promised to pay any difference if a 
customer payed higher price for using Orbitz even after the trip had occurred and that 
they would track this reliving the customer from this duty. At the same time, Orbitz 
dropped their consumer prices. One of the competitors, Travelocity also reduced their 
prices which could have been a reaction to Orbitz policy. (Bilotkach & Rupp 2014, 349 
– 350.). 
The nature of the contracts between the travel agents and the airlines used to be that 
one agent gets the cheapest quotations directly from the airline. The fact that the agents 
are having price guarantee policies and that they try to match their competitors’ prices 
can be then considered a buyer subsidy. In the study of Bilotkach & Rupp, two of the 
three companies implemented this policy. This means that one player’s strategy might 
have caused others to react as well. Additionally, all the airlines also removed their book-
ing fees during the studied period which also supports the idea of a buyer subsidy.  
Did the strategy work for Orbitz? That is hard to say, they increased their sales during 
the period of the study but currently all the three brands are in fact owned by Expedia Inc. 
that has become one of the two leading online travel booking companies with multiple 
aggregator websites. (Expedia Inc. annual report, 2016,1) 
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The competition between the online travel agents has been heating up lately. There has 
been a lot of acquisitions in the last 15 years leading into a situation where a few players 
own most of the brands. Two biggest players are The Priceline Group which owns for 
example booking.com and Momondo and is by far the biggest player outside of US and 
Expedia Inc. that owns for instance Trivago and Hotels.com being the biggest platform 
in US. There are, of course, smaller especially regional companies. In Finland, Super 
saver is still a large platform while facing hard competition. The two biggest companies, 
The Priceline Group and Expedia, as well as multiple smaller ones have been advertising 
very aggressively even in Finland. The top three adword budgets in February 2017 be-
longed to Trivago, ebookers.fi and booking.com while also Momondo and hotels.com 
made it to the list of top 40. In addition, there were some brick and mortar agencies like 
Tjäreborg on the list as well. (Genero, “Suurimmat AdWords-mainostajat helmikuussa 
2017”, 22.3.2017).  
Interestingly, the two big players are not trying to focus on one platform each but ac-
tively promote multiple ones. These platforms are actively advertised on television as 
well. Personally, I have multiple times seen three different platforms running an ad during 
the same commercial break. Company data suggest this as well, for example Trivago has 
spent over 80% of its revenue to advertising in three consecutive years from 2014 to 2016. 
The actual numbers spent in advertising in those years are 271 million, 432 million and 
623 million euros. (Trivago Annual Report 2016, 56). It is quite remarkable that adver-
tising represents over 80% of the company’s cost structure and shows that the company 
can serve new clients virtually at no cost and all the money goes into getting new users 
and maintaining old ones. Then, of course, it is very important to capture as much market 
as possible using not only advertising but tactics like buyer subsidies. The goal would be 
to get in to a position where the buyers have deep loyalty towards the platform so that 
they would be less subsided leaving more profit. This could be considered as the single-
homing index discussed in earlier chapters, a term brought by Rochet & Tirole. The mar-
ket seems to have some qualities from Caillaud & Julliens article, as well. Many compa-
nies do not turn profits early on as they need to use large amount of the money to maintain 
and grow their market share or they could become non-used as buyers would adopt pes-
simistic beliefs towards them.  
The online travel agents have also significantly changed the travel industry, not only 
by bringing competition towards brick and mortar agents but also changing the whole 
pricing system. In the hotel industry, where the online travel agents have become very 
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popular among consumers, the buyers are heavily subsidized by the platforms. In North 
America consumers who would make their reservation through a booking platform would 
receive 44 % discount compared to the regular price of the room (Cossa & Tapatta 2013, 
3). Interestingly Cossa & Tapatta found that those discounts are not only hotels unsold 
inventory but also normal priced rooms. They suggested that the hotels may use online 
travel agents to price discriminate customers. It is likely that those who book through the 
hotel’s own web page are less price sensitive and more brand loyal than those using an 
online travel agent.  
  
5.3 The frictionless trade; disrupting traditional industries  
Two-sided markets have disrupted many industries for different reasons. Not only have 
they become matching platforms and intermediaries for already existing sellers like 
online travel agents or online market places, but they have also started offering new ser-
vices competing with traditional non-platform industries in the same markets. 
There are some other instances where the market is disrupted by more competition on 
the seller side when a two-sided market emerges. Sometimes a two-sided market can 
bring competition by circumventing regulations. The controversial peer riding services 
Uber and Lyft would be this kind of two-sided markets. The taxi services have tradition-
ally been quite regulated industries even in the United States. The cities have often limited 
the number of taxis allowing to operate within its area. For instance, in New York it has 
been possible to invest in a Taxi medallion (license to operate one’s own taxi). However, 
Uber drivers often operate without owning a taxi license (Ridesharing, Uber driver re-
quirements: Do you qualify to drive? 3.4.2018) and as a result, the value of a Taxi me-
dallion has dropped in US after these taxi type services have brought additional competi-
tion to this regulated market. In Europe, there has been a huge backslash against Uber 
from law makers and Taxi services with the accusations of circumventing the local laws. 
These accusations are not completely unfounded. Uber has been acting as an intermediate 
in connecting its drivers and the clients. This gives them an unfair advantage compared 
to taxi firms as they can ignore many mandatory regulations towards workers’ protection. 
Therefore, it is harder to say if the actual platform has any market disrupting advantage 
or is their success a result of circumventing the current regulation.  
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There are also clear instances where platforms disrupt the market for other reasons 
than circumventing current regulations. They might just have a superior technology and 
perhaps a better reachability of customers with extremely low marginal cost. One of these 
disruptors would be Craiglist with their classified ads. Craiglist an eMarket focused on 
consumer to consumer sales of product and services. Craiglist allows users to post ads 
and browse them online, entering into a market previously highly dominated by newspa-
pers and especially local ones. Its Finnish equivalent would be tori.fi.  
Between 2000 and 2007 Craiglists entry to the ad market lead to over 20% drop in the 
classified ad rates imposed by the newspapers. It also generally raised subscription prices 
to the newspapers. It is estimated to have saved over 5 billion USD for the classified ad 
buyers from 2000 to 2007. (Seamans & Zhu 2014, 490). In their study, Seamans & Zhu 
also found that those newspapers most dependent on classified ad income were by far 
most hurt by the Craiglist’s entry into the market.  
When comparing Craiglist to local newspapers, it is not hard to see the advantages that 
Craiglist has. First, it allows users to perform advanced searches it is already more effi-
cient matchmaker than the papers. It also has unlimited space for the ads and the ads are 
cheaper to produce. Craiglist started as a nonprofit company which might have influenced 
its success on attracting the sellers which it managed to do convincingly. Perhaps the only 
advantage a newspaper would have is the constant influx of the buyer side in form of 
readership. However, Craiglist has managed to establish itself as US wide brand that has 
a large user base from the buyer side. 
One market disruptor is Airbnb which allows regular people to rent their homes as a 
hotel type service via the Airbnb platform. Airbnb also allows people to sell experiences 
for instance tourist guidance or cooking classes through their platform. This is a separate 
service but it often has a complementary nature.  
Airbnb has some competitive advances compared to hotels. It can react with great 
flexibility towards changes in demand. Since it does not have to own any property and 
can have minimal staff, both the fixed cost and the marginal cost of serving a client are 
very low which result in some great advantages. The case of slow demand in some area 
does not cause Airbnb any sort of loss in unused property like it would do for a hotel. On 
the other hand, it can respond to an increase in demand with little friction. When the 
demand increases in a certain area, for instance due to a yearly festival, the prices rise 
quickly and more people are willing to rent their homes via the platform. There is some 
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empiric data backing up this claim. In an empirical study (Zervas et al. 2016) found that 
Airbnb specifically reduces hotels’ average prices during times of a peak demand.  
This optimal response to changes in the demand is very typical for the two-sided mar-
kets. In a way they create optimal market conditions between buyers and sellers that can 
resemble perfect competition or at least come closer to it than a market that operates 
normally. 
Airbnb has been able to exploit their advantages very well. In 9 years Airbnb has been 
able to grow in to multinational company with over 2,6-billion-dollar revenue (Bort, 
“Airbnb made $93 million in profit on $2.6 billion in revenue, but an internal showdown 
with the CFO has put an IPO on pause”, Nordic Business Insider). Indeed, the quick suc-
cess of Airbnb has already had a notable effect in the hotel industry. One Credit Suisse 
analyst showed that hotel prices started going down in 2015. The room prices were as 
much as 18% down in January 2015 from the previous year (Philips, “New York City 
hotel rooms are getting cheaper thanks to Airbnb”, Quartz, 9.2.2015).  
Similar impacts have been noted elsewhere. Texas concluded that the weakest hotels’ 
revenues were impacted by 8-10% in Austin as the result of Airbnb coming into the mar-
ket. (Zervas et al. 2016, 688). Their study found a clear impact by Airbnb coming into 
the market as the hotel prices in 2014 and 2015 levelled or went down in all price cate-
gories from previous years in Austin, where Airbnb is strong, while kept going up Dallas, 
where there are very little Airbnb homes. They found that the prices went down especially 
during the high demand season compared to the years when Airbnb was not yet in the 
market.  
This is an indication that Airbnb’s frictionless response to changes in demand, affect 
hotels’ possibilities to raise prices during a high demand. Hotels that are mostly catering 
leisure travelers took the biggest hit while those who mostly serve business travelers were 
less impacted by Airbnb’s competition (Zervas et al. 2016, 697). The hotels responded to 
new competition by lowering prices (Zervas et al. 2016, 704). Interestingly this means 
that not only the consumers who chose Airbnb benefitted from competition but also those 
who kept using hotel services meaning that in this case, consumers as whole are the win-
ners of this two-sided market.  
All the platforms discussed in this subchapter, seem to have at least attributes that 
apply for both the models, the one by Rochet & Tirole of competing platforms and the 
one by Caillaud & Jullien without exclusivity except Airbnb which does not seem to have 
a relevant platform competitor. The price structure is favoring mostly buyers, again, with 
70 
exception of Airbnb where they have interestingly two different prices depending on the 
nature of the trade.  
Generally, Airbnb has a transaction fee 3 % for host and a between 0-20 % transaction 
fee for the guest. However, in their service for providing experiences, the seller pays the 
whole 20 % and the buyer is charged no fee. (Airbnb, What are Airbnb Service Fees? 
23.4.2018). Of course, this could be a coincidence but it could also be that the elasticities 
of demand towards Airbnb platform differ depending on the type of the service. If the 
experience provider sells their service as professional, and are depend on the generated 
income, they could have lower elasticity of demand than the home renters who are likely 
to have another source of income. On the other hand, this could also be caused by the 
buyer side. The experience is a complementary service and the buyers might have higher 
elasticity of demand towards the service than for finding a place to rent. Either of these 
hypotheses would cause a shift in the price structure by changing the relation between the 







5.4 Reverse auctions platforms; international trade and labor out-
sourcing 
There are multiple different types of two-sided markets that work different ways. How-
ever, since they are becoming more and more relevant it is good to analyze if there are 
indications on who benefits most of the rise of the platform economy. It is also interesting 
to see if anyone loses when a new platform emerges into an industry.  
In most of the cases, consumers (or the buyer side) should be better off with a platform 
since platforms, especially the matching ones, tend to increase competition that saves 
their time of doing research of the market prices on their own. In addition, they often tend 
to get subsidized as a strategy by the platform to capture more market thus, improving 
the consumer’s welfare even more. Moreover, the market situation before the platforms 
might be regulated and the platform can perhaps break the regulation.  
There is one type of benefit for the buyer side that has not been discussed in this article. 
International outsourcing and direct international B2B sales have become a normal form 
of business that helps buyer companies to find more options and possibly cut the middle 
man, for instance, an importer. Special cases are those where, not only can the buyer 
compare large number of sellers, but also publish a project and ask for offers from the 
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seller. These matching platforms are essentially creating a situation of a reverse auction. 
This applies, for instance to platforms that connect suppliers to customers like Alibaba 
and platforms that help in outsourcing like upwork.com. They often function as the re-
versed first price sealed auctions where the buyer creates a project and the sellers react to 
it with sealed offers. After having received the offers, they can negotiate with the sellers 
before making the decision. The buyers can still even opt out of the deal if they choose. 
(Upwork, How it works?,) 
This system puts the buyer in a favorable situation. The reverse auction yields similar 




 , 𝑛 being the number of bids. If the platform is popular among the sellers, 
the number of bids should be high. Additionally, the auctioneer can set a max cost which 
then eliminates the possibility for the sellers to use symmetric equilibrium strategies. In 
most platforms, the sellers do not know accurately the amount of the bidders for the re-
verse auction. This makes the bidder’s task to use any strategies even harder.  
With this reverse auction system, the buyer side can get adequate bids for their project 
even with a presence of high information asymmetry for instance in a case of buying 
products directly from a manufacturer or hiring a freelancer from abroad. The buyer will 
benefit from the transparency of and the fact that the bidders often fiercely compete to 
win the auction. Also, they are not limited geographically in a same way as often in nor-
mal trade without the platform. (Manoochehri & Lindsy 2008, 125). 
These possibilities of using a platform can bring huge benefit for the buyer. Buying 
directly from the supplier for instance through Alibaba cuts off the importer and can lower 
the costs significantly. When considering the case of hiring a freelancer the cost level can 
be lower as the buyer can look to get service from countries with a lower wage level in 
general. Additionally, if the buyer does not have a good knowledge of the price level of 
the project, the auction mechanism helps them to get close to truthful quotations from 
sellers which might not be the case had they to negotiate independently. The savings for 
a company can be huge. After Rio Grande Regional Hospital started using a bidding pro-
cess to contract individual nurses, their wage costs dropped over 64 % (Zack, 2006, 14). 
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5.5 Who loses in the platform economy 
So, who loses in the platform economy if anyone? In most cases, the sellers should also 
get benefits in a form of more demand for their product or service. Even if they are the 
ones who end up paying the buyer a subsidy, this should leave them at least profitable as 
otherwise they would not participate in the platform. However, there can be cases where 
the sellers participate but it is not hundred percent clear if they are happy to do so. One 
example would be the shops that accept the credit cards. Shops end up paying for the 
convenience of the shoppers not having to carry money but it is unclear, what is the ben-
efit of the credit cards for the shops themselves. On the other hand, they cannot really 
stay out and not accept as the customers would just carry their cards elsewhere. Some-
times shops try to drive customers away from using credit cards with tactics like giving 
cash discount or have minimum payment for credit card purchases. (Emch & Thompson 
2006, 49). This is an indication that they are not necessarily happy with the widespread 
use of the cards. The big law suits towards the platforms are an indication that merchants 
would rather not allow these cards to be used, as well.  
Another group that might lose when a two-sided market emerges are clearly those who 
benefit from the uncompetitive market conditions that are present without the two-sided 
market. These conditions can be a result of regulations such as in the taxi services. In that 
case a debate might arise if the regulations are needed. The barriers can also be something 
more natural. The information asymmetry between the trade parties and the lack of com-
mon legal ground can cause the buyers to prefer local sellers or importers as middleman 
in international trade. When a two-sided market emerges, the importers and local sellers 
might be worse off. For importers they face a completely new type of competition that 
can be more efficient. In the case of local sellers, the situation is similar erasing a tariff 
or trade barrier in international theories. The local production must move to another in-
dustry if they are not competitive enough. However, for the seller that has a comparative 
advantage, the market size increases with a platform. Producers in China for instance 
enjoy much larger markets through the Alibaba platform. With freelancers, again it de-
pends on where they live. If they are from a country with a high capital/labor ratio com-
pared to the rest of the world, they become worse off. The aggregate offer for a labor 
increases through the platform more than any possible projects to participate and thus the 
local wage level decreases. On the other hand, the workers in countries with low K/L 
ration will be better off with more opportunities. (Lucas, 1990).  
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Sometimes, the market just could be inefficient allowing the sellers to enjoy the mo-
nopoly power and good negotiation positions. In the end, in many cases the whole value 
created by the platform lies in lowering the search cost for the buyers. Yannis Bako ar-
gued already in 1998 that many industries from electronic appliance sellers to travel 
agents will see their monopolistic power to go down as the price transparency goes up.  
Even if currently the consumer is benefitting from the platforms, it is important for the 
antitrust agencies to beware of the growing platforms. While currently the monopolies 
might not be harmful for the economy, with this new topic it is impossible to say with 
certainty if this remains in the future. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
This article aimed to bring some clarity into the literature of two-sided markets which is 
currently rich but quite vague without any clear definitions and terminology. The article 
identified some definitions on what a two-sided market is, what are some of the main 
theories of competition related to and how do they differ. The chapter two, identified an 
acceptable definition of the phenomenon having three key properties to separate from the 
traditional one-sided markets and one unique to this article to divide the two-sided mar-
kets into two different types depending on some key properties. Chapters three and four 
went through the main theories of the two-sided market competition and their implica-
tions as well as. In those chapters, the article also tried to identify what possible empirical 
examples would be relevant with to which theory. The chapter five went deeper into con-
necting the theories with empirical examples by providing some real-world instances of 
different two-sided markets. The chapter shed some light on different questions related 
their competition with the examples.  
Based on this article and previous literature, it is obvious that the two-sided markets 
have different properties than the normal firms and compete in a different fashion. Many 
of these properties are attributed to the cross-network benefits that heavily influence the 
two-sided markets. The platforms might use a variety of tactics in growth and compete 
very aggressively. They also, face some unique problems when growing that they need 
to solve. 
However, when successfully launched, the two-sided market platforms can be very 
profitable as often they can operate with extremely high volume while maintaining low 
costs compared to normal firms. Indeed, with the examples, this article presented how in 
numerous instances traditional firms can suffer when a two-sided market starts to com-
pete with them.  
The examples also shed light on who are the winners and the losers of the platform 
economy. This article argues with supporting results from previous studies that the con-
sumers are almost exclusively benefitting from the two-sided markets. Often the core 
concept of a two-sided market is to bring transparency into the market benefitting the 
consumers. Moreover, due to the nature of the pricing structures, the consumers often end 
up being subsidized by the platform. Besides, the firms that get trampled by the compe-
tition introduced by a platform, the sellers sometimes can end up on the losing side, as 
well. It seems that there are instances where a platform can be so influential that sellers 
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are forced to participate in it, even while being the ones who end up paying the con-
sumer’s subsidy. This has resulted in antitrust lawsuits as some of the platforms are be-
lieved to exploit their monopolistic power. Of course, it is not a clear cut that all the sellers 
lose. They can get more demand and some of them can be so popular among the custom-
ers that they can negotiate a favorable deal with the platform. 
The previous literature on the subject has managed to identify the two-sided markets 
as a subject for academic research. It has also managed to create some widely accepted 
theories on the competition of two-sided markets. These theories have sparked more de-
tailed continuations on top them as well as some empirical experiments on the subject. 
The empirical studies have managed to support some claims of the theories, for instance, 
the peculiar price structure. 
However, as the subject is relatively young, there is room for more studies definitively 
for empirical ones but probably also for new theoretic ones. Empirical ones will become 
easier to conduct as there are number of new platforms emerging thanks to internet while 
some already established have not yet produced enough data to study but will do it within 
a decade. One interesting area to study would be the equilibrium points of the chicken 
and egg problem. When do users start to naturally gravitate towards a platform? With the 
Visa card they had to give millions of cards for their users for free of charge. With many 
internet platforms rising, it becomes easier to study these cases and find the tipping points. 
Perhaps studying the geographic of the spread of some services can give us an empirical 
indication of the equilibriums. Other area with a need to conducts studies is the antitrust 
perspective as the platforms are becoming bigger and bigger players in the global markets 
making it important to know what the consequences are if they have a monopoly situation. 
All in all, with the raise of internet-based commerce, the two-sided markets make an in-
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